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HERE COMES THE JUDGE: A MODEL FOR
JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF
THE BRADY DISCLOSURE DUTY
Cynthia E. Jones*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land. Only
judges can put a stop to it.1
– Judge Alex Kozinski
Under the current state of the law, there is no mechanism in place to
ensure that a criminal defendant receives information in the exclusive
possession of the government that negates guilt, undermines the strength
of the government’s case, or reduces the sentence that could be imposed.
Whenever a prosecutor wants to do so, she can suppress this favorable
information and prevent the court and the defense from ever learning of
its existence. Without oversight and with very little accountability,
prosecutors have been vested with the power to determine whether and
when to disclose favorable evidence to the defense. Although many
prosecutors diligently comply with the constitutional disclosure duty
mandated by Brady v. Maryland,2 for a wide variety of reasons, others
do not, or do not do so invariably. Every year, there are numerous
reported opinions where the court finds that a prosecutor has failed to
disclose favorable information to the defense. As one scholar has noted,
“violations of Brady are the most recurring and pervasive of all
constitutional procedural violations.”3
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. I would like to
dedicate this Article to the memory of two extraordinary people, Judge Frank E. Schwelb, who was
my mentor and my biggest supporter since the early days of my career when I served as his law
clerk on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals; and Professor Andrew “Taz” Taslitz, whose
intellectual curiosity, kindness, friendship, laughter, and generosity will always inspire me to try to
be a better person. I also want to thank my research assistants, especially Bridget Lynn, who
provided invaluable assistance in the final stages.
1. United States v. Olson, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
2. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3. Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE
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As I have previously documented, suppression of favorable
information by the prosecution causes wrongful convictions and
compromises the integrity of the entire criminal adjudication process.4
One 2014 study of over 600 cases found that Brady violations are more
prevalent in death penalty cases.5 Also, when the Innocence Project
examined DNA exonerations, 37% of the cases “involved the
suppression of exculpatory evidence.”6
Despite the scope and magnitude of Brady non-compliance, in over
fifty years since the Supreme Court’s landmark 1963 decision, very little
regulation or enforcement of the Brady disclosure duty has occurred. A
few state and federal courts have taken steps to regulate or codify the
Brady disclosure duty,7 but most have not.8 In addition, a small handful
of states have passed “open file discovery” laws that require virtually all
non-privileged information collected by the government during the
criminal investigation be disclosed to the defense.9 Post 2009, however,
in the wake of the botched prosecution of United States Senator Ted

W. RES. L. REV. 531, 533 (2007).
4. See Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference
of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 428-31 (2010) (discussing Brady violations in
death penalty and wrongful convictions cases); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 399, 403.
5. KATHLEEN RIDOLFI ET AL., MATERIAL INDIFFERENCE: HOW COURTS ARE IMPEDING FAIR
DISCLOSURE IN CRIMINAL CASES, at x, 43 & fig.20 (2014) (concluding that “withheld favorable
information is overrepresented in death penalty decisions” based on a study finding 53% of the
death penalty cases involved nondisclosure or late disclosure of favorable information to the defense
attorney representing a defendant in a capital case).
6. Jones, supra note 4, at 429 n.60.
7. Press Release, N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., Chief Judge DiFiore Announces
Implementation of New Measure Aimed at Enhancing the Delivery of Justice in Criminal Cases, at
1 (2017), http://www.nycourts.gov/PRESS/PDFs/PR17_17.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2017); see also
N.Y. STATE JUSTICE TASK FORCE, REPORT ON ATTORNEY RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL CASES 78, app. B (2017), http://www.nycourts.gov/PRESS/PDFs/PR17_17.pdf; LAURAL L. HOOPER ET AL.,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TREATMENT OF BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIAL IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT
AND STATE COURTS’ RULES, ORDERS, AND POLICIES: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CRIMINAL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 17-28, 18 tbl.3 (2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/bradymat_1.pdf (discussing codification of Brady in
state criminal procedure rules).
8. See LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO A
NATIONAL SURVEY OF RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CRIMINAL RULES 27-28, 28 fig.4, 30 & fig.6 (2011) http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/rule16rep_2.pdf; see also infra Part I.B.1.
9. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1331
(2011); see also RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 5, at 23.
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Stevens,10 the Department of Justice opposed federal legislation that
would have regulated the disclosure of favorable evidence under
Brady,11 and the Department of Justice thwarted an amendment to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that would have clarified the scope
of the Brady disclosure duty.12
Early intervention by trial courts is crucial in preventing the
suppression of favorable information by the prosecution. Although trial
courts are on the front lines of Brady enforcement during pretrial
litigation and throughout the trial, trial judges traditionally rely on
prosecutors to self-regulate their Brady disclosure duty.13 Trial courts do
not become involved in managing and regulating the Brady disclosure
duty until the defense identifies favorable information in the
government’s possession that has not been disclosed and judicial
intervention is needed to compel the government to produce the
information.14 This level of detachment and passivity by trial judges has
proven ineffective in implementing the Brady mandate.15 Trial judges
have the expertise and authority to provide the critical oversight needed
to ensure that the government complies with the Brady disclosure duty.16
Part II of this Article provides an overview of Brady and discusses
three major obstacles that impede implementation of this constitutional
disclosure duty. Part III proposes a comprehensive model for proactive
judicial management and regulation of the Brady disclosure duty. Part
IV discusses non-contempt sanctions that trial courts should employ to
punish and deter prosecutors who fail to disclose favorable evidence in
violation of the Brady mandate.

10. See ROBERT M. CARY, NOT GUILTY: THE UNLAWFUL PROSECUTION OF U.S. SENATOR
TED STEVENS 236 (2014); OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION
OF ALLEGATIONS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN UNITED STATES V. THEODORE F. STEVENS,
CRIM. NO. 08-231 (D.D.C. 2009) (EGS) 188-91, 193-95 (2011); Lisa Rein, Review Board Clears
U.S. Prosecutors Accused of Botching Sen. Ted Steven’s Corruption Trial, WASH. POST
(Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/01/14/panel-clears-us-prosecutors-accused-of-botching-sen-ted-stevenss-corruption-trial/?utm_term=.2c64adf1ed95.
11. The Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. (2012).
12. Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, Enforcing Compliance with Constitutionally-Required
Disclosures: A Proposed Rule, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 138, 142 (2016).
13. Jones, supra note 4, at 422-23, 431-34.
14. Id. at 433-34.
15. Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the
Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 2031-35 (2010).
16. See RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 5, at 47-49; Symposium, supra note 15, at 2029-35
(discussing various ways in which judges can provide oversight over Brady disclosure compliance).
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II. THE BRADY DOCTRINE AND THE OBSTACLES TO REGULATION
Our criminal justice system is implemented by imperfect and
fallible human beings, and some errors and unjust outcomes are
inevitable . . . . But the most dreaded and devastating example of justice
gone awry is the conviction and prolonged incarceration (and in some
jurisdictions the execution) of an innocent defendant, and the rule of
Brady v. Maryland is designed to prevent such miscarriages of justice.17
– Judge Frank E. Schwelb
A. The Brady Doctrine
In Brady, the Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to disclose to the
defense all favorable information in the government’s possession.18
Subsequent Supreme Court cases held that “favorable” information
under Brady includes exculpatory information, impeaching information
that tends to undermine the strength of the government’s case,19 and
mitigating information that could potentially reduce the sentence the
defendant faces.20 The Court has also recognized that Brady imposes on
the prosecutor a due diligence obligation to investigate and collect all
favorable information in the prosecutor’s own files, as well as
information held by any member of the prosecution team (i.e. law
enforcement officers, forensic analysts).21 The Brady disclosure
obligation begins pretrial and exists as a continuing disclosure duty
throughout the adjudication of the case.22 The government is obliged
to disclose Brady material even in the absence of a request by
the defense.23
The Brady doctrine is deeply rooted in principles of fairness. The
Brady Court stated that “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”24
In other post-Brady cases, the Court recognized that the Brady rule aids

17. Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094, 1107 (D.C. 2011).
18. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963).
19. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1985) (plurality opinion); Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972).
20. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88.
21. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995).
22. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999).
23. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 68081.
24. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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in preventing “a miscarriage of justice”25 and directs prosecutors to
perform their duties mindful that their obligation “is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done.”26
The Court has stated that “the Constitution is not violated every
time the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that might
prove helpful to the defense.”27 Nondisclosure of favorable information
constitutes a denial of due process only when the government suppresses
favorable information that is “material” or prejudicial. In determining
materiality, the Court evaluates whether the “net effect of the evidence
withheld by the State”28 creates “a reasonable probability that . . . the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”29 A “reasonable
probability” exists when the government’s suppression of favorable
evidence “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.”30 If the
favorable information suppressed is insignificant, cumulative, or when
viewed in the context of the other evidence presented in the case, does
not prejudice the defendant, there has been no constitutional violation.31
Thus, a Brady violation requires a showing that the government
negligently, recklessly, or intentionally (1) suppressed; (2) favorable
information in its possession; (3) which was material in the case.32
When a court finds a Brady violation, the usual pretrial remedy is
court-ordered disclosure of the information.33 More commonly, Brady
violations are not discovered until post-conviction, and the usual remedy
is reversal of the conviction and a new trial.34 In addition to providing a
remedy for the defendant, courts also have the power to impose
sanctions for Brady misconduct. Sanctions generally take the form of
adverse action against the government’s case—striking testimony,
excluding evidence, and granting an adverse jury instruction.35 Rarely do
courts impose sanctions on the prosecutor responsible for the Brady

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1995).
Id. at 421-22.
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
Id. at 678; see Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-37.
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-82 (1999).
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1143 (5th ed. 2009); see also
HOOPER ET AL., supra note 8, at 29 & fig.4 (stating that a survey of federal judges revealed that the
most common remedies for criminal discovery violations were disclosure and continuance).
34. See Jones, supra note 4, at 443; see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 33, at 1143.
35. Jones, supra note 4, at 443, 446-47, 446 n.131; see ROBERT M. CARY ET AL., FEDERAL
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY 386, 389-92, 394-96, 398-400 (2011); HOOPER ET AL., supra note 8, at 29.
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violation, even when there is a finding of intentional and egregious
Brady misconduct.36
B. Obstacles to Implementation of Brady
There are three sets of obstacles that impede the successful
implementation of the Brady disclosure duty. The first obstacle is the
fact that the government has the power to retain exclusive possession
and control over most of the evidence, and a criminal defendant has only
a very limited right of access to evidence collected during the
investigation.37 Thus, if favorable evidence exists in the government’s
files, there is no formal mechanism for the defense or the court to learn
of its existence without the prosecutor conscientiously complying with
Brady.38 The second obstacle stems from the ambiguity in the handful of
Supreme Court cases that define the scope of the Brady disclosure duty.
Because lower courts have largely failed to develop clear policies and
procedures to “fill in the gaps” and regulate the Brady mandate, the
government has used the ambiguity to very narrowly interpret its
disclosure duty.39 The third obstacle is the pervasive culture of resistance
and noncompliance that has emerged from the lack of judicial oversight
or accountability.40 As discussed below, each of these obstacles are
surmountable through proactive judicial regulation and oversight of the
Brady disclosure duty throughout the case.
1. Access to Evidence
A good argument could be made that Brady was doomed to fail at
the outset because the United States Supreme Court squandered a golden
opportunity to establish a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to
discovery or right to equal access to evidence collected by the
government during the course of a criminal investigation. The Brady
Court could have recognized that while the government has traditionally
maintained exclusive possession of criminal evidence, the government
does not “own” the information collected in criminal cases. Although the
government has a strong interest in protecting the integrity of the
inculpatory information needed to secure a conviction, establishing a
broader due process right to equal access to evidence would have been in
36. HOOPER ET AL., supra note 8, at 29 (stating that federal judges rarely hold attorneys in
contempt or report Brady misconduct to the Department of Justice or the state bar for professional
disciplinary action).
37. Jones, supra note 4, at 431-34.
38. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 33, at 959-73.
39. Jones, supra note 4, at 432-33.
40. See infra Part II.B.3.
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harmony with Brady’s lofty aspirational goals of “fairness” and ensuring
that “justice shall be done.” If the Court had chosen this path many of
the problems that plague the Brady disclosure duty could have
been avoided.
The idea of a constitutional right to equal access to evidence is not
completely foreign to criminal procedure jurisprudence. Long before
Brady, it was well-established that the prosecution could not engage in
conduct to impede the defense in its efforts to interview prosecution
witnesses.41 This right to equal access to witnesses remains a bedrock
principle of criminal law that has long been recognized by state and
federal courts and codified in many state criminal rules.42 This rule was
elevated to a due process right in Gregory v. United States.43 In Gregory,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
ruled that the government violated the defendant’s right to due process
by advising witnesses not to speak to the defense unless the prosecutor
was present.44 The court reasoned that a criminal trial is a “quest for the
truth” that is best when both sides have equal access to “the information
from which the truth may be determined.”45 The court noted that the
prosecution cannot frustrate the defense in the preparation of its case by
effectively blocking their access to witnesses.46 The rationale employed
by the Gregory court was:
Witnesses, particularly eyewitnesses, to a crime are the property of
neither the prosecution nor the defense. Both sides have an equal right,
and should have an equal opportunity, to interview them. Here the
defendant was denied that opportunity which . . . elemental fairness
and due process required that he have . . . .
. . . . [W]e know of nothing in the law which gives the prosecutor the
right to interfere with the preparation of the defense by effectively
denying defense counsel access to the witnesses . . . . Presumably the
41. State v. Papa, 80 A. 12, 15 (R.I. 1911) (“Witnesses are not parties, and should not be
partisans. They do not belong to either side of the controversy. They may be summoned by one or
the other or both, but are not retained by either. It would be a most unfortunate condition of affairs if
a party to a suit, civil or criminal, should be permitted to monopolize the sources of evidence
applicable to the case to use or not as might be deemed most advantageous.”).
42. Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Interference by Prosecution with Defense Counsel’s
Pretrial Interrogation of Witnesses, 90 A.L.R.3d 1231 (1979), Westlaw (database updated Oct.
2017); see, e.g., COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 (“[N]either the prosecuting attorney, the defense counsel, the
defendant nor other prosecution or defense personnel shall advise persons having relevant material
or information (except the defendant) to refrain from discussing the case or with showing any
relevant material to any party, counsel or their agent, nor shall they otherwise impede counsel’s
investigation of the case.”).
43. 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
44. Id. at 187-89.
45. Id. at 188.
46. Id. at 188-89.
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prosecutor, in interviewing the witnesses, was unencumbered by the
presence of defense counsel, and there seems to be no reason why
defense counsel should not have equal opportunity to determine,
through interviews with the witnesses, what [the witnesses] know
about the case and what they will testify to.47

The Gregory court’s “equal access to witnesses” analysis should
apply with equal, if not greater, force to Brady evidence. There is no
principled reason to grant the defense broad access to “live witness”
evidence, while simultaneously allowing the government to restrict
defense access to documents, forensic reports, and written witness
statements that either exculpate the defendant or are critical to the
preparation of a defense. There may be legitimate reasons for drawing a
distinction between prohibiting the government from affirmatively
interfering with the defense’s ability to seek out or find its own
evidence, versus imposing an obligation on the government to grant the
defense access to evidence in the government’s possession. This
distinction is rendered meaningless, however, if, like the government,
the criminal defendant has a right to have equal access to evidence
collected during a criminal investigation.
In sharp contrast to the “access to evidence” approach, the Brady
Court precariously placed the duty to disclose favorable information
within the hostile atmosphere of criminal discovery. In 1963, when
Brady was decided, criminal discovery was very limited and there was
no right to discovery in criminal cases.48 Thus, there was instant hostility
to Brady, not only because it mandated disclosure of exculpatory
evidence, but also, more fundamentally, because Brady mandated
disclosure of any evidence to the defense.49
Unlike civil discovery, the evolution of criminal discovery is
marred by a history of antagonism and distaste for allowing criminal
defendants to receive any information related to the charges they were
facing. The entrenched opposition to criminal discovery can be traced
back to English common law. In Rex v. Holland, the government filed
embezzlement charges against the defendant after conducting a lengthy
investigation that culminated in a written report.50 The defense made a

47. Id. at 188; see, e.g., United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288, 295 (8th Cir. 1971) (adopting
the Gregory due process rule (citing Gregory, 369 F.2d at 188)); State v. Murtagh, 169 P.3d 602,
617 (Alaska 2007) (same (quoting Gregory, 369 F.2d at 188)); Penalver v. State, 926 So. 2d 1118,
1130 (Fla. 2006) (same).
48. Thea Johnson, What You Should Have Known Can Hurt You: Knowledge, Access, and
Brady in the Balance, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 6 (2015).
49. See id. at 7-8.
50. (1972) 100 Eng. Rep.1248, 1248.
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pretrial request to obtain a copy of the report and the court rejected the
defense’s request.51 One jurist reasoned
the rule for inspection is confined to civil cases . . . . In ordinary cases
when an indictment is found . . . the defendant is taken into custody:
but that gives him no information, nor does it entitle him to demand an
inspection of the grounds upon which the prosecution is
instituted . . . . The practice on common law indictments, and on
informations on particular statutes, shews it to be clear that this
defendant is not entitled to inspect the evidence, on which the
prosecution is founded, till the hour of trial. 52

Concurring in the holding, other jurists noted that allowing discovery in
criminal cases would “lead to the most mischievous consequences”53 and
“subvert the whole system of criminal law.”54
More than a century later, the common law rule remained deeply
engrained in the American criminal justice system. In 1923, in United
States v. Garsson,55 Judge Learned Hand expressed his strenuous
opposition to criminal discovery in the following oft-quoted passage:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While
the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the
barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment
on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt
in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in
advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over at his
leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able
to see.56

The justifications for maintaining the common law rule were
articulated by the court in State v. Tune,57 where, over the vigorous
dissent of future United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan,
the court refused to grant a capital defendant the right to receive a copy
of his written confession.58 The court reasoned that, unlike civil
proceedings, “long experience has taught” that discovery in criminal
cases will lead to perjury, evidence suppression, and witness
intimidation.59 Moreover, the court noted that the defendant’s Fifth
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1248-49.
Id. at 1249-50 (Buller, J., concurring)
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1249 (Kenyon, L.C.J., concurring).
291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
Id. at 649.
98 A.2d 881, 884-86 (N.J. 1953).
Compare id. at 893-94, with id. at 894-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 884.
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination would preclude the
State from making reciprocal discovery demands.60 The court further
reasoned that allowing the defendant to obtain discovery from the
government would place the government “completely at the mercy of the
defendant” and would “make the prosecutor’s task almost
insurmountable.”61 In his dissent in Tune, then-Judge William J.
Brennan stated: “It shocks my sense of justice that in these
circumstances counsel for an accused facing a possible death sentence
should be denied inspection of his confession which, were this a civil
case, could not be denied.”62 While acknowledging the very real dangers
of obstruction of justice and witness intimidation, Judge Brennan
suggested that these concerns should not be addressed through the denial
of all discovery but through protective orders issued by the court.63
More than a decade after Brady, modern criminal discovery rules
emerged in state courts, and later in federal courts, carving out specific
exceptions to the common law.64 Beyond the specific categories of
information subject to disclosure under discovery rules, however, there
is still no general “right to discovery” in criminal cases.65 As a vestige of
the common law rule, the government still retains exclusive control over
all evidence collected in criminal cases. Neither the trial court nor the
defense is privy to the non-privileged information contained in the
government files.66 The government is also not obligated to provide the
court with an inventory of the evidence gathered during the criminal
investigation, nor is the government required to disclose whether
60. Id. at 884-85.
61. Id. at 885.
62. Id. at 896 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 894-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal
Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 12
(1990). Subsequent writings illustrate the significant impact that the Tune decision had on Justice
Brennan. For nearly four decades following his dissent in Tune, he continued to attack the
justifications advanced in the majority opinion for denying discovery in criminal cases. See id. at 58 (criticizing the rationale of the Tune court).
64. Criminal discovery rules and statutes vary greatly, but the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and state discovery statutes generally entitle criminal defendants to specific categories of
information, including the following: (1) the defendant’s statements and prior criminal record; (2)
tangible evidence the government plans to introduce at trial; (3) information related to expert
testimony; and (4) any reports or forensic analysis of evidence to be presented at trial. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16(a)(1), 17(c)(1); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 33, at 972-73 (noting that many
criminal discovery rules still do not independently mandate disclosure of all police reports and
officer notes, the identity of government witnesses, or witness statements collected by the
government).
65. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 33, at 959-73; see also Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298,
317 n.7 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing numerous early common law cases rejecting the notion of pretrial
discovery in criminal cases).
66. Jones, supra note 4, at 431-34.
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evidence has been withheld or file a declination statement setting forth
the reasons why information has not been disclosed.67 As a result,
judges do not know what information—favorable or unfavorable—
is in the government’s possession and cannot readily determine
whether the government has violated its statutory or constitutional
disclosure obligations.
Today, the Brady disclosure duty is tethered to the dysfunction and
acrimony of criminal discovery. Moreover, the Court has made clear that
Brady was not intended to create a broader constitutional right to
discovery or usher in an overhaul of the criminal discovery process.68
Post-Brady, the Court has steadfastly maintained that “[t]here is no
general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady
did not create one.”69 Moreover, the Court has held that the prosecutor
alone decides whether information in the government’s possession is
“favorable” and subject to disclosure under Brady,70 and “the
prosecutor’s decision on disclosure is final.”71 The Court has provided
no standards beyond the general pronouncements of its Brady
jurisprudence that the prosecutor is obliged to use in making the
favorability determination, nor is the prosecutor required to disclose to
the court how this determination is made.72 While prosecutors can
consult with the court ex parte, they are not constitutionally required
to do so.73
Thus, any effective Brady reform by the trial court must address the
obstacles caused by the government’s control of evidence and the
limited authority of the court to demand disclosure of information
contained in the prosecutor’s files. As discussed in more detail in Part II,
with the use of standing court orders, Brady checklists, certifications,
and other administrative tools, trial courts can overcome this obstacle
and effectively regulate and manage the disclosure of favorable evidence
in the government’s possession.74
67. See LAURAL HOOPER & SHELIA THORPE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BRADY V. MARYLAND
MATERIAL IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS: RULES, ORDERS, AND POLICIES 20-21 (2007),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/BradyMa2.pdf (stating that nine of thirty-seven districts
refer to declination procedures with varying degrees of specificity).
68. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
92 (1963) (White, J., concurring).
69. Bursey, 429 U.S. at 559.
70. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 59-60 (1987).
71. Id. at 59; Brennan, Jr., supra note 63, at 9 (quoting Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 59).
72. Joy, supra note 4, at 421 & n.116 (stating that prosecutors make Brady determinations “in
secret, based on personal judgment that often is not subject to any established guidelines or public
oversight”).
73. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57-58.
74. See infra Part III.A.
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2. Ambiguity of the Brady Doctrine
Another obstacle that impedes the disclosure of favorable
information by the government is ambiguity regarding the scope of
Brady. The lack of clarity in Supreme Court cases has led to inconsistent
interpretations of the Brady doctrine by lower courts75 and inconsistent
disclosure practices among prosecutors.76 When the suppression of
favorable information is discovered, prosecutors frequently argue that
they were unaware that the information was subject to disclosure
under Brady.77
More than fifty years after the Court decided Brady, there is still a
constant flow of litigation in state and federal courts to resolve
fundamental issues regarding the scope of the Brady disclosure duty.78
Although the Court has stated that the Brady disclosure duty begins
pretrial, there remains much ambiguity regarding exactly when the
prosecution is required to disclose Brady information to the defense.79
This has led to last-minute, mid-trial disclosures of favorable
75. BRUCE GREEN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 3 (2011), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/ABA105D.pdf (“The duty to disclose varies by
jurisdiction—between state and federal jurisdictions, among state and federal jurisdictions, and even
within state and local offices. For this reason, the scope of the federal and state prosecutors’
disclosure obligations is often unclear and conflicting.”).
76. See id. at 12-13, 20 (“[W]ildly different policies in the local United States Attorney
Offices and, on occasion, amongst Assistant United States Attorneys in a particular office.”); see
also Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 4, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/memorandum-heads-department-litigating-componentshandling-criminal-matters-all-united-states (discouraging “inconsistent discovery practices among
prosecutors within the same office” and “disparate discovery disclosures to a defendant based solely
on the identity of the prosecutor who happens to have been assigned a case”).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 686 F. Supp. 2d 147, 156-58 (D. Mass. 2010); Jones,
supra note 4, at 428 & nn.56-57.
78. Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1540 &
n.43, 1541 & nn.44-48 (2010) (discussing the “vagueness” of the Brady doctrine as an impediment
to prosecutor determining whether evidence is “favorable” or “material”).
79. Some state court and local federal district court discovery rules tie Brady disclosure to the
arraignment date to ensure disclosure occurs very early in the criminal adjudication process. See,
e.g., W.D. WASH. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (2017) (requiring disclosure within fourteen days of
arraignment); M.D. TENN. CT. R. 16.01(a) (2016) (requiring disclosure on or before fourteen days
from the date of arraignment); N.D. FLA. R. 26.2(D)(1) (2015) (requiring disclosure within seven
days of arraignment “or promptly after acquiring knowledge thereof”); S.D. GA. CT. R. 16.1 (2013)
(requiring disclosure within seven days of arraignment); S.D. FLA. R. 88.10(c), (q)(2) (2010)
(requiring discovery not later than fourteen days after arraignment); CONN. R. CRIM. P. app. at 145
(2009, amended 2017) (requiring disclosure within fourteen days of arraignment). In jurisdictions
where no time limits are specified, courts have held that Brady material need only be disclosed in
time for effective use at trial. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094, 1115-19 (D.C. 2011);
see also GREEN, supra note 75, at 9 (stating that there is no uniform rule among state and federal
courts regarding “pre-trial disclosure” of Brady material); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword: New
Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1943, 1953 (2010).
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information. Further, the Court has never addressed whether the
government is required to deliver favorable information to the defense in
the original format, or whether the government can meet its Brady
obligations by simply disclosing a summary of the favorable
information.80 This ambiguity has led to the government providing
unfair, inaccurate, and misleading summaries of favorable information.
Most of the ambiguity over the Brady disclosure duty involves the
application of the “materiality” requirement. The Supreme Court has
been clear that the suppression of favorable evidence by the government
is not a denial of due process unless the suppressed evidence is
“material” to guilt or punishment.81 The Court has been less clear,
however, regarding whether Brady mandates disclosure of all favorable
information, regardless of whether it is material, or whether the
government disclosure duty only requires disclosure of favorable
information if the prosecutor determines that the information is material
in the case.82 Under this more narrow view of the Brady disclosure duty,
the government could suppress favorable information that it subjectively
believes is cumulative, not credible, only minimally negates guilt, or
would be inadmissible at trial.83
80. See Gershman, supra note 3, at 548 (discussing how prosecutors can strategically deliver
a massive number of boxes containing information and bury the Brady material to frustrate the
ability of the defense to identify and use favorable information).
81. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
82. See Miller, 14 A.3d at 1109 (“In a claim that is remarkable for its breadth, the government
asserts in a footnote to its brief that the prosecution ‘was not obligated to disclose this information at
all’ because Brady requires disclosure only of information that is both favorable to the defense and
material to the outcome.”).
83. See DiSimone v. Phillips, 461 F.3d 181, 192-95 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that allowing the
prosecutor to determine whether favorable information is reliable would be “to appoint the fox as
henhouse guard”); Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1040 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the prosecutor
does not decide “whether the contents of an official police record [are] credible”); United States v.
Thomas, 981 F. Supp. 2d 229, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating the determination of the reliability of
exculpatory information is a judgment call for the defense attorney, not the prosecutor); see also
Jones, supra note 4, at 439 & n.105, 440 & nn.106-09 (discussing cases where prosecutors
attempted to justify nondisclosure of Brady material based on their subjective assessment of the
quality and value of the favorable information). The trial judge in a Florida death penalty case
reversed the defendant’s conviction due to a Brady violation where the prosecutor stated that she did
not disclose favorable impeachment evidence to the defense because she felt it would be
inadmissible hearsay. The court stated the following:
It is not the province of the prosecutor to either characterize or categorize evidence that,
no matter how remote it might seem to her, could be exculpatory . . . . [P]rosecutors
should not determine the consistency or inconsistency of statements made by material
witnesses. Prosecutors do not rule on issues of admissibility of evidence and they
certainly do not limit disclosure by determining that it is rumor or hearsay.
Elizabeth Johnson & Lee Williams, Second Mistrial Ordered in Lee Murder Case, HERALDTRIBUNE, http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20130924/ARTICLE/130929811?p=all&tc=pgall
(last updated Sept. 24, 2013) (quoting Circuit Judge Peter Dubensky).
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Prosecutors find strong support for the narrow interpretation of the
Brady disclosure duty in the language of several Supreme Court cases.
In United States v. Agurs, the Court stated:
First, in advance of trial, and perhaps during the course of trial as well,
the prosecutor must decide what, if anything, he should voluntarily
submit to the defense counsel. Second, after trial a judge may be
required to decide whether a nondisclosure deprived the defendant of
his right to due process. Logically the same standard must apply at
both times.84

Later, in Kyles v. Whitley, the Court reiterated that the prejudice
prong of a Brady violation is not met unless there is a reasonable
probability that the suppressed evidence undermined confidence in the
verdict and stated that this determination allows the government to
exercise “a degree of discretion.”85 The Court further stated:
[T]he prosecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed, must be
assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of
all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of “reasonable
probability” is reached.86

Further, in Cone v. Bell, the Court stated that “[a]lthough the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by Brady,
only mandates the disclosure of material evidence, the obligation to
disclose evidence favorable to the defense may arise more broadly under
a prosecutor’s ethical or statutory obligations.”87 In drawing a clear
distinction between the more liberal ethical standard (which requires
prosecutors to disclose all favorable evidence, regardless of

84. 427 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1976).
85. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
86. Id.
87. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009) (emphasis added) (first citing STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 3-3.11(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N
1993, amended 2015); then citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2008, amended 2016); then citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437; and then citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108).
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materiality)88 and the constitutional due process standard, the Court
signaled that materiality is relevant to the pretrial disclosure duty.89
Notwithstanding the language used by the Court, only a small
minority of courts have embraced the application of the materiality
requirement to pretrial disclosure of favorable information.90 Most courts
have held that the government is required to disclose all favorable
information in its possession, without regard to materiality.91 Moreover,
courts and scholars have criticized the pretrial application of materiality
as both unfair and impractical. They have argued that prosecutors cannot
properly assess materiality at the pretrial stage when evidence has not
been presented and the defense is unknown.92 Thus, materiality is solely
88. Rule 3.8(d) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct commands the following of
the prosecutor:
[M]ake timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in
connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved
of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal . . . .
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). The ABA has interpreted this
rule as imposing an ethical obligation of disclosure that is more extensive than the constitutional
obligation of disclosure. ABA Comm’n on Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 2 (2009).
Thus, under Kyles and Cone, a prosecutor might be constitutionally, but not ethically permitted to
suppress favorable evidence that is not material. The rule has been interpreted to be more
demanding than the constitutional standard. See id. at 4 & n.18. Notably, some jurisdictions that
have adopted Rule 3.8 have interpreted it to be consistent with the constitutional disclosure duty
mandated by the Brady doctrine. The rule has been adopted under the state ethical rules for
prosecutors in every state except in California. Laurie Levenson & Barry Scheck, California Is
Overdue in Adopting Rule on Exculpatory Evidence, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014, 5:39 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1216-levenson-prosecutorial-misconduct-20141216story.html.
89. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104, 107 (discussing the Brady decision).
90. United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 142-44 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing materiality as “a
result-affecting test that obliges a prosecutor to make a prediction as to whether a reasonable
probability will exist that the outcome would have been different if disclosure had been made”);
United States v. Jacobs, 650 F. Supp. 2d 160, 166-67 (D. Conn. 2009) (refusing to order disclosure
of information “which the government may have withheld upon a determination that such
information is not ‘material’ to the fairness of the trial”).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Singhal, 876 F. Supp. 2d 82, 103-04 (D.D.C. 2012); United
States v. Moore, 867 F. Supp. 2d 150, 151 (D.D.C. 2012); United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12,
16 (D.D.C. 2005); United States v. Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1246-47 (D. Nev. 2005) (“Thus,
prosecutors in this district and elsewhere are obligated to timely disclose to the defense evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense,
whether or not these disclosures meet Brady’s materiality standard.”); United States v. Sudikoff, 36
F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198-1202 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094, 1109 (D.C.
2011) (in rejecting the government’s contention that the prosecution “‘was not obligated to disclose
this information at all’ because Brady requires disclosure only of information that is both favorable
to the defense and material to the outcome,” the court cited Strickler for the proposition that the
duty to disclose, exists even if the evidence is not material and suppression would not warrant
reversal (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999))).
92. See Zanders v. United States, 999 A.2d 149, 163-64 (D.C. 2010); Christopher Deal, Brady
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a post-trial standard used by reviewing courts to determine whether the
suppression of favorable evidence constitutes a Brady violation.93
As one commentator has aptly noted, if the prosecutor is allowed to
suppress evidence based on a pretrial assessment that the evidence is not
material, “the guiltier a defendant seems before trial, the less disclosure
he is legally owed.”94 Moreover, making disclosure of favorable
information subject to the prosecutor’s subjective assessment of whether
the favorable information is material in the litigation allows the
prosecutor to prevent the defense of ever learning of favorable
information in its files and provides no mechanism for the trial court to
rein in rogue prosecutors who intentionally suppress evidence. As
Justice Kagan recognized in her dissenting opinion in Turner, a case
involving allegations of Brady misconduct by prosecutors: “The
Government got the case it most wanted . . . . And the Government
avoided the case it most feared . . . . The difference between the two
cases lay in the Government’s files—evidence of obvious relevance that
prosecutors nonetheless chose to suppress.”95
While the United States Supreme Court has not clarified the
ambiguity regarding materiality, oral and written statements of
individual Supreme Court justices in recent cases support the view that
the government’s duty to disclose favorable information to the defense is
separate and distinct from the determination of whether non-disclosure
of favorable information is material or sufficiently prejudicial to
constitute a denial of due process. Most recently, Justice Alito, joined by
Justice Thomas, dissented in Wearry v. Cain, where the Court held that
the prosecution failed to disclose favorable information in violation of
Brady and reversed the capital conviction.96 Justice Alito disagreed with
the Court’s factual analysis of whether the government’s nondisclosure
was prejudicial but concluded:
There is no question in my mind that the prosecution should have
disclosed this information, but whether the information was sufficient
to warrant reversing petitioner’s conviction is another matter. The
Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty to Disclose and the Right to a Trial by Jury, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1780, 1798-1809 (2007).
93. United States v. Edwards, 887 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[N]either the
Government nor the Court is in a position to conclusively determine at this stage” whether the
information “will not be favorable to the Defendant in preparing his defense”); see Zanders, 999
A.2d at 164 (“It is not for the prosecutor to decide not to disclose information that is on its face
exculpatory based on an assessment of how that evidence might be explained away or discredited at
trial, or ultimately rejected by the fact finder.”).
94. Deal, supra note 92, at 1784.
95. Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1899 (2017) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
96. 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1004-06, 1008 (2016) (per curiam).
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failure to turn over exculpatory information violates due process only
“if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.”97

Further, in Smith v. Cain, the Court concluded that suppression of
pretrial statements violated the disclosure duty imposed by Brady.98
Notably, during the oral argument before the Court, the attorney for the
government—the State of Louisiana—repeated the common
misconception that “this Court has held that favorable evidence which is
not material need not be turned over to the defense.”99 Most of the
justices quickly disputed the accuracy of this statement.
Justice Kennedy: . . . [Y]ou were asked what is—what is the test for
when Brady material must be turned over. And you said whether or not
there’s a reasonable probability . . . that the result would have been
different. That’s the test for when there has been a Brady violation.
You don’t determine your Brady obligation by the test for the Brady
violation. You’re transposing two very different things . . . .100
Justice Ginsburg: A prior inconsistent statement, one that is favorable
to the defense, has to be turned over, period. I thought [that’s] what
Brady requires . . . .101
Justice Scalia: . . . [S]top fighting as to whether it should be turned
over[.] Of course, it should have been turned over. I think the case
you’re making [here] is that it wouldn’t have made a
difference . . . . [B]ut surely it should have been turned over.102
Justice Sotomayor: I said there were two prongs to Brady. Do you have
to turn it over, and, second, does it cause harm. And the first one you
said not. That—it is somewhat disconcerting that your office is still
answering equivocally on a basic obligation as one that requires you to
have turned these materials over . . . whether it caused harm or not.103

97. Id. at 1008 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995)).
98. 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012).
99. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, 565 U.S. 73 (No. 10-8145); see id. at 37-38 (noting the
argument of the government’s attorney that the prosecutor’s determination of materiality governs
under the Brady doctrine).
100. Id. at 49.
101. Id. at 51.
102. Id. at 51-52.
103. Id. at 53; see also Janet C. Hoeffel & Stephen I. Singer, Activating a Brady Pretrial Duty
to Disclose Favorable Information: From the Mouths of Supreme Court Justices to Practice, 38
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 467, 480-83 (2014).
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Notwithstanding the very clear (but non-binding) statements by the
justices, the published opinion in Smith v. Cain did not discuss the
materiality issue,104 allowing the ambiguity regarding materiality to
linger. Because the government has exclusive control over criminal
evidence, the defense and the courts will not know whether prosecutors
are incorrectly applying the materiality standard to justify nondisclosure
of favorable information. As discussed in Part III below, trial courts can
use standing orders, Brady checklists, certification requirements, and
other tools, to prevent ambiguity from interfering with the Brady
disclosure duty.105
3. A Culture of Resistance and Noncompliance
The fairness principle at the core of the Brady doctrine imposes on
prosecutors a duty to ensure that “justice shall be done.”106 Although
prosecutors believe they have a responsibility to be “just” and “fair,”
they also maintain an equally strong belief that the defendant is guilty
and deserves to be convicted and punished. Prosecutors and members of
the prosecution team fear that compliance with Brady will result in
unjust acquittals.107 They worry that “dishonest” defense attorneys will
use the favorable information to “create” a baseless defense, distort the
“real” facts of the case, or otherwise gain an unfair advantage in the
litigation.108 In other words, they fear that the disclosure of favorable
information allows the guilty to go free. Thus, directing prosecutors to
adhere to ideals of justice and fairness mean little if the prosecutor does
not think justice will be served by arming criminal defendants with
favorable information.109

104. Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012).
105. See infra Part III.A. Some jurisdictions have simply adopted a rule expressly
mandating disclosure “without regard to materiality.” See, e.g., S.D. ALA. R. 16(b)(1)(B)
(2015) (“At arraignment, or on a date otherwise set by the Court for good cause shown, the
government shall tender to Defendant the following: . . . All information and material known to the
government which may be favorable to the Defendant on the issues of guilt or punishment, without
regard to materiality, within the scope of Brady v. Maryland.” (citation omitted) (citing 373 U.S. 83
(1963))).
106. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88 (1935)).
107. Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 103, at 476 & n.46.
108. Id.
109. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 698 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The
prosecutor surely greets the moment at which he must turn over Brady material with little
enthusiasm. In perusing his files, he must make the often difficult decision as to whether evidence is
favorable . . . .”).
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As one former prosecutor candidly states:
[W]hen the evidence is weak, or some of the evidence might actually
hurt the prosecutor’s case, and prevent that defendant from getting
what he deserves, the temptation is strong to simply not share it . . . .
[I]t’s a full-on moral judgment that sharing it before trial would
categorically be the wrong thing to do.110

Over time, these concerns produce a culture of resistance in prosecution
offices, especially where Brady training is either inadequate
or nonexistent.
Brady noncompliance is also the product of confirmation bias, a
cognitive bias that causes a person to view or interpret information in a
way that is consistent with her own theories, beliefs, or expectations.111
As one report states:
A prosecutor reviewing a case file for the first time is testing the
hypothesis that the defendant is guilty and is looking for information to
confirm that expectation. Because the police or agents have “solved”
the case, there will undoubtedly be information in the file to support
the guilt hypothesis. Thus, as a result of confirmation bias, the
prosecutor that expects to become convinced of guilt then engages in
selective information processing, accepting as true information that is
consistent with guilt and discounting conflicting information as
unreliable or unimportant. Information discounted as unpersuasive,
unreliable, or unimportant will rarely rise to the level of “material” in
the mind of that prosecutor.112

As a former public defender, I understand very well the
transformation that an advocate makes in preparing a case for trial. I can
recall not only believing that I could win the case, but also believing that
I would win (because victory was the only just outcome supported by
my theory of the case). In some cases, this eventually morphed into me
being absolutely convinced of my client’s innocence. When supervisors
and more senior lawyers in the office pointed out the significant
weaknesses in my defense, I would passionately explain how I could
attack the credibility of the government witnesses, challenge the
unreliability of the forensic evidence, and successfully move to exclude
my client’s confession. My cognitive bias framed my exaggerated view
110. Nathaniel Burney, Is Open File Discovery a Cure for Brady Violations, BURNEY L. FIRM,
http://burneylawfirm.com/blog/2012/02/28/is-open-file-discovery-a-cure-for-brady-violations (last
visited Oct. 22, 2017).
111. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Why Do Brady Violations Happen?: Cognitive Bias and Beyond,
CHAMPION (May 2013), https://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=28470; see RIDOLFI ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 22 & n.122.
112. RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 5, at 22.
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of the strength of my case and the perceived weakness or inadmissibility
of the government’s evidence.
Similarly, I believe that zealous prosecutors who interview crime
victims, consult with police officers, and diligently prepare their cases
for trial experience cognitive bias. They believe they are going to win,
they believe they should win, and they believe any evidence to the
contrary—evidence favorable to the defense—is insignificant, not
credible, and/or inadmissible. I can understand why prosecutors
convinced of the guilt of the defendant have a difficult time disclosing
information in their exclusive possession that will undermine the
government’s case.
In addition to these internal conflicts, there are other practical
barriers that impede compliance with the Brady disclosure duty. As
discussed elsewhere,113 some Brady violations are caused by “bad
actors” who intentionally suppress favorable information to gain a
tactical advantage in the litigation.114 In many other cases, Brady
noncompliance is caused by a legitimate lack of understanding by
members of the prosecution team regarding what Brady commands.115
Given the ambiguities in the Brady jurisprudence, discussed above, it is
reasonable to assume that many prosecutors are unclear about what must
be disclosed.116 Despite the Supreme Court’s flawed assumption that all
aspiring prosecutors learn Brady in law school,117 a plethora of cases in
state and federal reporters attest to the fact that these law school
graduates never learned or never fully understood the Brady doctrine.118
Even seasoned prosecutors have difficulty engaging in the fact-specific
analysis demanded to identify and disclose favorable information to the
defense.119 Consequently, when prosecutors in good faith report to the
court that they have complied with Brady, their understanding may
differ significantly from what Brady demands.120
As Professor Bennett Gershman has stated, the Brady doctrine has
become so complex that “it is virtually impossible to identify clear and
113. Jones, supra note 4, at 428, 447-49 (discussing the intentional suppression of favorable
evidence by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage in the litigation and the remedial measures
courts should employ during trial to thwart these efforts).
114. Medwed, supra note 78, at 1551.
115. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 56-58 (2011).
116. See supra Part II.B.2.
117. Compare Thompson, 563 U.S. at 64, with Susan A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, The
Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 715, 727-28 (2011).
118. Bennett L. Gershman, Educating Prosecutors and Supreme Court Justices About Brady v.
Maryland, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 517, 529-30 (2012).
119. Medwed, supra note 78, at 1551-52.
120. See Gershman, supra note 3, at 548-50, 550 n.100.
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consistent norms of compliance by prosecutors as to what evidence is
required to be disclosed, when it must be disclosed, and permissible
reasons for noncompliance.”121 Thus, shortly after the collapse of the
prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens, Judge Sullivan stated, “I encourage
the Attorney General, for whom I have the highest regard, to require
Brady training for new and veteran, experienced prosecutors throughout
the country.”122 Not long thereafter, then-Attorney General Eric
Holder made criminal discovery training a central component of his
effort to reform criminal discovery practices in the Department of
Justice.123 Brady training is also a central feature of state Brady
reform initiatives.124
The misunderstanding of the Brady doctrine extends beyond
prosecutors to other members of the prosecution team. Kyles imposed on
prosecutors a duty to investigate and uncover favorable information in
the possession of the entire prosecution team.125 The “prosecution team”
broadly consists of other lawyers, paralegals, and investigators in the
prosecutor’s office; all law enforcement officers working on the case;
and other government agencies or entities likely to be in possession of
information related to the case (e.g. independent forensic science units,
hospitals). Thus, Brady requires prosecutors to inquire of the other
members of the prosecution team and ascertain whether they are in
possession of any records or files containing favorable information.126
121. Id. at 534.
122. Transcript of Record at 8-9, United States v. Stevens, No. 08-231 (D.D.C. 2009).
123. See Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-james-mcole-testifies-senate-judiciary-committee (last updated Sept. 17, 2014); Attorney General: Eric H.
Holder, Jr., U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/attorney-general-eric-h-holder-jr (last
updated Aug. 24, 2017).
124. See, e.g., In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure—Rule 3.113, 139 So. 3d
292, 293 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam) (instituting mandatory Brady training); TEX. DIST. & CTY.
ATT’YS ASS’N, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 23-27 (2012)
(describing Texas’s statewide effort to provide training to state prosecutors on Brady and other
discovery obligations).
125. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995); Gershman, supra note 3, at 552.
126. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(4) (“The prosecuting attorney’s obligations extend to
material and information in the possession or control of (A) members of the prosecuting attorney’s
staff, and (B) any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and
who either regularly report or with reference to the particular case have reported to the prosecuting
attorney’s office.”); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1(f) (“The prosecutor’s obligation under this rule extends
to material and information in the possession or control of any of the following: (1) The prosecutor,
or members of the prosecutor’s staff, or (2) Any law enforcement agency which has participated in
the investigation of the case and that is under the prosecutor’s direction or control, or (3) Any other
person who has participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who is under the
prosecutor’s direction or control.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 22-2002(A)(3) (2002) (“[M]aterial and
information in the possession or control of members of the prosecutor’s staff . . . any information in
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This “due diligence” requirement also mandates that prosecutors
preserve favorable information in possession of any member of the
prosecution team.127 Brady is still violated, therefore, even if the
prosecutor is not aware of the existence of exculpatory information.128
In some cases, the prosecutor cannot disclose favorable information
because law enforcement officers and other members of the prosecution
team do not know what information must be retained and what
information must be disclosed to the prosecutor.129 A prosecutor simply
asking a law enforcement officer, “Do you have any Brady material in
this case,” would be ineffective if the officer is unaware of the scope of
the Brady disclosure duty. Moreover, even when law enforcement
officers have been trained on Brady, many law enforcement agencies do
not have formal policies and procedures in place to ensure compliance
with the Brady disclosure duty.130 One state study found that more than
one-quarter of the Brady violations were the result of nondisclosures and

the possession of law enforcement agencies that regularly report to the prosecutor of which the
prosecutor should reasonably know, and . . . any information in the possession of law enforcement
agencies who have reported to the prosecutor with reference to the particular case of which the
prosecutor should reasonably know.”).
127. See McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1567-69 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that police
officer concealed evidence favorable to the defendant from the prosecutor), amended by 101 F.3d
1363 (11th Cir.) (per curiam); see also In re Sealed Case No. 99-3096, 185 F.3d 887, 896 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (stating that the U.S. Attorney’s Office violated Brady where prosecutors failed to conduct a
complete search of all law enforcement agencies’ files for favorable material).
128. See United States v. Thomas, No. 06-553, 2006 WL 3095956, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2006)
(ordering the government to disclose “[a]ny material evidence favorable to the defense related to
issues of guilt, lack of guilt or punishment which is known or that by the exercise of due diligence
may become known to the attorney for the United States, within the purview of Brady v. Maryland
and its progeny” (emphasis added)).
129. Richard Lisko, Agency Policies Imperative to Disclose Brady v. Maryland Material to
Prosecutors, POLICE CHIEF, Mar. 2011, at 12, 12; see TEX. DIST. & CTY. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note
124, at 15.
130. Disclosing
Exculpatory
Evidence,
LAW
OFFICER
(Feb.
18,
2012),
http://www.lawofficer.com/article/investigation/disclosing-exculpatory-evidenc (“Although several
big city and county agencies have established protocols regarding the disclosure of Brady materials,
many agencies haven’t. More importantly, agencies often don’t provide any meaningful training to
officers on this important issue. Anecdotally, many officers haven’t even heard of the Brady v.
Maryland decision and its progeny . . . .”); see Lisko, supra note 129, at 12-13 (stating that many
police departments do not adequately train police officers on Brady and do not have policies in
place to ensure that Brady material will be turned over to the prosecution). But see R.C. Phillips,
Training Bulletin, SAN DIEGO SHERIFF’S DEP’T, http://www.sdsheriff.net/legalupdates/
docs/bradytrainingbulletin.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (providing a very detailed explanation of
the Brady doctrine, including what types of information must be disclosed to the defense, and what
police personnel information is potentially subject to disclosure under Brady).
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other errors by law enforcement.131 The American Bar Association
(“ABA”) places the burden of educating the prosecution team squarely
on the shoulders of the prosecutor’s office.132 According to the ABA’s
Standards for Criminal Justice: “The prosecutor should take steps to
promote compliance . . . with . . . [all] legal rules” and “assist in
providing training to police and other law enforcement agents
concerning potential legal issues and best practices in criminal
investigations.”133 More specifically, the ABA encourages prosecutors to
work with law enforcement agencies to ensure that there are adequate
policies and procedures in place regarding the Brady disclosure duty.134
Proper training of prosecutors and law enforcement officers is a
surmountable obstacle to judicial regulation and enforcement of the
Brady disclosure duty. Courts can play a leadership role in ensuring that
the prosecutors who litigate in their courtrooms have been properly
trained on what Brady commands. Courts can also play a leadership role
in ensuring that prosecutors work collaboratively with law enforcement
to provide training and institute policies and procedures to identify and
preserve Brady material. While there are many examples of willful,
intentional Brady misconduct by prosecutors, in far more cases courts
have found that nondisclosure of favorable information by the
prosecutor was the product of the prosecutor’s misunderstanding of the
Brady disclosure duty.135 As discussed in more detail below, through the
use of standing orders and “Brady checklists,” courts can eliminate the
common “I didn’t know this information was Brady” excuse for
nondisclosure of favorable evidence.136

131. TEX. DIST. & CTY. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 124, at 15 (finding that twenty-six percent
of Brady errors were caused by law enforcement nondisclosures to prosecutors and noting that
Brady is not currently part of law enforcement training program and few law enforcement agencies
have adopted written policies and procedures on Brady compliance).
132. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS Standard 26-1.3
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
133. Id. Standard 26-1.3(b), (d).
134. See id. Standard 26-1.3(b) cmt. at 65 (“The prosecutor should seek access to all police
notes and reports that may contain exculpatory evidence, and police departments should be
encouraged to promulgate administrative processes that require police officers to be trained to
preserve potentially exculpatory evidence and to turn such evidence over to prosecutors.”).
135. United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 183 (D. Mass. 2009).
136. See infra Part III.A.1–2.
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JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION

Some prosecutors don’t care about Brady because the courts
don’t make them care.137
– Judge Alex Kozinski
The United States Supreme Court either assumed prosecutors
would routinely comply with Brady without oversight or assumed judges
would provide the oversight needed to enforce the Brady mandate.138
Perhaps, for that reason, the Court did not carve out a specific role for
trial judges to play in regulating the Brady disclosure duty. Individual
judges can, however, institute rules and practice standards for the cases
in their courtroom. More significantly, trial courts can promulgate
uniform court rules to govern all criminal proceedings.139 As discussed
below, these management and regulatory measures will allow trial
judges to move past the obstacles that impede the successful
implementation of the Brady disclosure duty.
A. Criminal Discovery Regulation and Management Practices
for Trial Judges
Trial judges are ideally positioned to oversee compliance with
Brady. Trial judges have access to all pleadings filed in the case and can
easily gain the level of familiarity with the facts of each case needed to
determine whether specific information is favorable to the defense. Also,
trial courts routinely engage in extensive pretrial litigation on a range of
constitutional and procedural issues in criminal cases, including
discovery disputes. Therefore, it would not be a broad extension of
authority for trial judges to institute specific measures to manage and
regulate the Brady disclosure duty during the pretrial stage of the case.
The essential components of judicial management and regulation of
Brady are: (1) comprehensive standing orders; (2) Brady checklists; (3)
pretrial “Brady compliance” hearings; and (4) mandatory certification of
Brady compliance.140 This package of tools must be coupled with a
range of appropriate sanctions, discussed in Part IV.

137. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
138. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 111.
139. Press Release, N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., supra note 7; see also N.Y. STATE JUSTICE
TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 8, App. B.
140. See United States v. Hykes, No. CR 15-4299 JB, 2016 WL 1730125, at *16 (D.N.M. Apr.
11, 2016); Yaroshefsky, supra, note 9, at 1345-46; infra Part II.A.
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1. Standing Orders
I . . . urge my judicial colleagues on every trial court to be vigilant
and consider entering an exculpatory evidence order at the outset of
every criminal case, whether requested to do so or not.141
– Judge Emmet Sullivan
In every criminal case, trial courts should issue an administrative or
“standing” court order governing the Brady disclosure duty.142 Standing
orders are commonly used by trial courts to detail the specific
procedures employed by the judge to implement governing laws. These
orders “fill in the gaps” and ensure that litigants are aware of the specific
practices that will be followed in all litigation before the judge.143 While
standing orders cannot conflict with, or exceed the scope of, existing
court rules, the authority to create binding standing orders is a valid
exercise of the court’s inherent supervisory powers.144 In addition,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b) gives federal judges wide
latitude to craft standing orders.145 As such, standing orders have the
force of law and can subject a litigant to contempt of court for violating
a provision of a standing order.146
Given the court’s lack of access to criminal evidence in the
government’s possession, standing orders allow judges to order the
government to disclose favorable evidence, specify when disclosure
must be made, and hold the government accountable for any favorable

141. Transcript of Record at 8-9, United States v. Stevens, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 08-231)
(D.D.C. 2009).
142. See Hykes, 2016 WL 1730125, at *15 (discussing the use value of pretrial orders to
disclose Brady material).
143. See COMM’N ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES ON STANDING ORDERS IN THE DISTRICT
AND BANKRUPTCY COURTS 8-9 (2009).
144. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional
and Statutory Limits on the Authority of Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1457-58, 147779 (1984); Bennett L. Gershman, Supervisory Power of the New York Courts, 14 PACE L. REV. 41,
57-62 (1994).
145. The rule provides:
A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and
the local rules of the district. No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for
noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the local district
rules unless the alleged violator was furnished with actual notice of the requirement
before the noncompliance.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b).
146. See, e.g., Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629, 631-32, 631 n.4 (5th Cir. 1967) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1984, amended 2015)); Fludd v. Gibbs, 817 So. 2d 711, 714 (Ala. Civ. App.
2001).
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information that is suppressed.147 Brady standing orders should, at a
minimum, contain a comprehensive discussion of the basic tenets of the
Brady doctrine, pursuant to both local law and Supreme Court precedent.
In this way, the standing order will provide clarity regarding ambiguous
aspects of the Brady doctrine and ensure that that all litigants are
operating under a common understanding of the full scope of the
disclosure duty. Specifically, the standing order should define what
constitutes “favorable” evidence,148 explain the court’s interpretation of
the materiality standard, and describe the full scope of the prosecutor’s
duty to investigate and learn of favorable information among members
of the prosecution team.
Second, to the extent local rules do not so do, the standing Brady
order should set strict timelines for disclosure and clarify that the duty to
provide supplemental favorable information extends throughout the case.
In addition, the standing order should inform the prosecution that
favorable information should be disclosed in its original format,
whenever possible, and not in summary form.
Finally, the standing order should state that violation of the
provisions of the order could subject the litigant to sanctions, including
contempt. As discussed in Part IV, the use of sanctions to enforce the
Brady disclosure duty is critical. Including a reference to sanctions puts
litigants on notice and encourages them to be diligent and thorough in
executing their responsibilities.149 A few courts and individual judges
have adopted standing orders that provide a comprehensive explanation
of Brady with the level of clarity and specificity needed to fully inform
litigants of the full scope of the disclosure duty.150 Included in the
detailed “Standing Brady Order” issued by Judge Emmet Sullivan of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia is the
following: “[I]f the government has identified any information which is
favorable to the defendant but which the government believes not to be
material, the government shall submit such information to the Court for
147. Thomas P. Sullivan & Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline Prosecutors
for Misconduct: Proposals for Reform, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881, 908 (2015).
148. If the court adopts a Brady checklist, the list will include a fuller explanation of each
category of favorable information. The court may, therefore, wish to have the checklist incorporated
into the standing order.
149. See Press Release, N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., supra note 7 (providing the report of the
N.Y. State Justice Task Force, which includes a model order directed to the prosecutors); see also
N.Y. STATE JUSTICE TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at app. B, at 15-16 (providing a model order
directed to the prosecutors); see also United States v. Perez, 222 F. Supp. 2d 164, 171 (D. Conn.
2002) (stating that the district court standing order mandated Brady disclosure within ten days of
arraignment); United States v. Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. 166, 169-70 (D. Conn. 1998) (same).
150. See, e.g., Standing Brady Order, No. XX-XX (EGS), http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/sites/
dcd/files/StandingBradyOrder_0.pdf.
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in camera review.”151 When coupled with the additional administrative
tools discussed below, standing orders can serve as an effective tool in
management of the Brady disclosure duty.152
2. Brady Checklists
The issuance of standing court orders should be coupled with the
use of Brady checklists, an itemized list of the different types of
exculpatory, impeachment, and mitigating information subject to
disclosure under Brady. These detailed worksheets provide a useful
guide for courts and litigants in determining whether a particular piece
of information is subject to disclosure.153 Trial judges can use the
checklist to query the government on whether specific forms of
favorable information have been disclosed. As well, the ABA has
endorsed the use of Brady checklists as an effective tool for the defense
in making more specific Brady requests and as a guide for the
prosecution in performing its search for Brady material that might exist
in the prosecution team’s files.154 Because the determination of whether
a particular piece of information is “favorable” requires a very casespecific factual analysis, Brady checklists are non-exhaustive guides
designed to assist litigants in identifying common categories of
favorable evidence.
A Brady checklist should, at a minimum, include the following
categories of information:
1. Information that would tend to negate or reduce the
defendant’s guilt of any count of the accusatory instrument or
reduce punishment.
2. Information about any promise, reward, or inducement
regarding a prospective witness.

151. Id. at 3.
152. See supra Part III.A.1, infra Part III.A.2-4.
153. Symposium, supra note 15, at 2019-20 (“The checklist should enumerate either specific
documents and items of evidence (e.g., forms by name or number, officer memo books), categories
of documents and evidence (e.g., police reports, recorded witness statements, lineup forms), or a
combination thereof . . . .”); Yaroshefsky, supra note 9, at 1345-46.
154. ABA resolution 104A states, in part:
the American Bar Association urges . . . courts to adopt a procedure whereby a criminal
trial court shall, at a reasonable time prior to a criminal trial, disseminate to the
prosecution and defense a written checklist delineating in detail the general disclosure
obligations of the prosecution under Brady v. Maryland and its progeny and applicable
ethical standards.
ABA, Adopted Resolution 104A to the House of Delegates (Feb. 4, 2011) (citation omitted)
(citing 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
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3. Information regarding criminal convictions or pending cases
of a prospective witness and, where available and in
circumstances that would not compromise ongoing
investigations, information regarding criminal conduct of a
prospective witness.
4. Information regarding the failure of a prospective witness to
make a positive identification at an identification procedure
involving the defendant or a co-defendant.
5. Any prior inconsistent oral or written statement by a
prospective witness regarding the alleged criminal conduct of
the defendant.
6. Whether a prosecution witness has recanted any testimony or
statement and, if so, the substance of that recantation.
7. Information that would impeach a prospective witness by
showing the witness’s bias or prejudice against the defendant,
character for lack of truthfulness, or mental or physical
impairment that may affect that witness’s ability to testify
accurately or truthfully.155
Also, if local law enforcement agencies seek to adopt standard
operating procedures on Brady, the checklist would be a useful starting
point.156 While there is some concern that the use of a Brady checklist
oversimplifies the prosecutor’s disclosure duties and could cause overreliance on the checklist by prosecutors, the ABA has cautioned that “the
written checklist does not relieve the prosecutor or defense counsel of
their legal and ethical responsibilities regarding disclosure.”157 The ABA
also recommends that if courts adopt a Brady checklist, courts also form
a committee comprised of local prosecutors and criminal defense
attorneys to aid the court in “formulating and updating the written
checklist delineating in detail the prosecution’s general disclosure
obligations.”158 Decades of reported opinions on Brady and the
experiences of trial judges also provide ample guidance on specific
categories of information that are commonly suppressed in violation
of Brady.
In addition to the general categories of exculpatory and
impeachment information on many Brady checklists, courts should
supplement the checklist to inquire about specific categories of
155. CRIMINAL COURTS COMM. & CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS COMM., ADOPTION OF A
BRADY CHECKLIST app. A at 4 (2011).
156. Symposium, supra note 15, at 1974-75 (“[A]s soon as the prosecutor becomes involved in
a case, that prosecutor should provide the checklist to each police agency involved in an
investigation related to that case.”).
157. GREEN, supra note 75, app. at 17.
158. Id.
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information that commonly lead to wrongful convictions. Over the last
twenty-five years, there have been over 300 exonerations of people who
were wrongly convicted. One study found that nearly forty percent of
exonerations involved Brady misconduct.159 Four categories of evidence
have emerged as the principle causes of wrongful convictions:
eyewitness misidentification, jailhouse informant testimony, false
confessions, and the use of faulty forensic science.160 Thus, in
developing Brady checklists, trial courts should query the government
on the specific categories of evidence that have commonly led to
wrongful convictions with a special emphasis on the reforms that have
been implemented in the jurisdiction, if any, to reduce the risk of
wrongful convictions.
a. Eyewitness Identification
Wrongful convictions studies and case profiles are replete with
cases showing that eyewitness identifications can be unreliable and lead
to wrongful convictions.161 According to a recent study, eyewitness
misidentifications were involved in seventy-two percent of all DNA
exonerations.162 “High risk” eyewitness identifications—those that
present the greatest chance for error—include stranger identifications,
single eyewitness identifications, or cross-racial identifications.163 In
addition, there is now a wide body of literature confirming that pretrial
identification procedures can contribute to misidentifications.164 As a
159. EMILY M. WEST, DIR. OF RESEARCH, INNOCENCE PROJECT, COURT FINDINGS OF
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIMS IN POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AND CIVIL SUITS AMONG
THE FIRST 255 DNA EXONERATION CASES 4 (2010).
160. See infra Part II.A.2.a–d.
161. The case of Earl Charles provides an apt example. Despite a solid alibi placing him in
another jurisdiction, the defendant was wrongly convicted of a double murder and sentenced to
death. See JUSTICE PROJECT, EXPANDED DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES 10 (2007),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/death_penalty_re
form/expanded20discovery20policy20briefpdf.pdf (discussing Charles v. Wade, 665 F.2d 661 (5th
Cir. 1982)). At trial, the government presented the testimony of two surviving witnesses to the
furniture store murder, neither of whom could identify the defendant in photographs from mug
books in repeated pretrial identification procedures. Id. Due in part to the suggestive nature of
pretrial identification procedures, these witnesses testified at trial and, with confidence, identified
the defendant as the assailant. Id. The government did not disclose to the defense that the
eyewitnesses failed to identify the defendant prior to trial and did not disclose that, following her
identification, one of the witnesses stated: “I could have made a mistake.” Id. As a result, the
defense was unable to challenge the credibility of the eyewitness testimony at trial. Id. at 11.
162. Emily West & Vanessa Meterko, Innocence Project: DNA Exonerations, 1989–2014:
Review of Data and Findings from the First 25 Years, 79 ALB. L. REV. 717, 732 (2016).
163. Id. at 745; see also Cynthia E. Jones, The Right Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted:
Judicial Sanctions for Destruction of DNA Evidence, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2893, 2929-30 (2009).
164. See id. at 2929-32; see also Gershman, supra note 3, at 555-56.
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result, many jurisdictions have reformed pretrial eyewitness
identification procedures to reduce the risk of false identifications.165 In
cases involving eyewitness identifications, the Brady checklist should
include the following:
1. Any information that any witness failed to identify the
defendant in any pretrial proceeding.
2. Any information that any witness identified someone other
than the defendant.
3. Any information that any witness expressed reluctance or
doubt about an identification of the defendant (i.e., “I’m not
sure, but I think that’s him” or “I believe that’s him, I can’t be
100% sure”).
4. Any information that any witness has recanted or repudiated
any identification of the defendant.
5. Any information that any pretrial identification of the
defendant was not conducted pursuant to established pretrial
identification procedures.
6. Any information that any person, whether or not a witness in
this case, failed to identify the defendant as the perpetrator or
has identified another person as the perpetrator.
b. Jailhouse Informant Testimony
The use of incentivized “snitch” testimony has led to numerous
wrongful convictions.166 Unlike accomplices, jailhouse informants have
no first-hand knowledge of the crime and claim only that the defendant
confessed to the crime. False information provided by these witnesses
has led to fifteen percent of the DNA exonerations.167 The informal and
formal agreements reached with these witnesses fall squarely within the
impeachment category of information subject to disclosure under the
Court’s holding in Giglio v. United States.168 Thus, in cases where the

165. Jones, supra note 163, at 2930, 2931 & n.214.
166. Id. at 2936-37; see Gershman, supra note 3, at 540-41, 554 (discussing cases where
witnesses approach prosecutors seeking some benefit in exchange for their testimony). Again, the
case of Earl Charles is instructive. In addition to the faulty eyewitness identification, the
government relied on the testimony of a jailhouse informant who testified that while he and the
defendant were in pretrial detention, the defendant bragged to him about the murders. JUSTICE
PROJECT, supra note 161, at 10. The informant also testified that no promises were made or
expected as a result of his testimony. Id. at 10-11. Post-conviction, it was learned that the detective
assigned to the case not only supplied the informant with the details needed to falsely implicate
Charles in the murders, but also wrote a letter on behalf of the informant recommending his release
from prison based on the informant’s assistance in the Charles case. Id. at 11.
167. West & Meterko, supra note 162, at 732.
168. 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972).
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government plans to present testimony of a jailhouse informant a Brady
checklist should be used to request the following:
1. Any promise, reward, or inducement that has been given to
any witness whom the government anticipates calling in its
case-in-chief, identifying by name each such witness and each
promise, reward, or inducement, and a copy of any promise,
reward, or inducement reduced to writing.169
2. Any description of any cases pending against any
witness whom the government anticipates calling in its case-inchief, identifying by name each such witness.170
3. Any prior case(s) where the witness was offered an
inducement to testify in a criminal case or provide information
in connection with a criminal investigation.171
4. Any information that the witness has previously given
unreliable or inaccurate information, or testified falsely against
another in any case.172
5. Any information that casts doubt on the accuracy or reliability
of the information provided by the informant (i.e. information
that the informant and the defendant were never housed in close
proximity to each other and were not in a position to
communicate with each other while in detention).
c. Custodial Confessions
Statements made by the defendant during custodial confessions are
discoverable under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and under
most state discovery statutes.173 Over a decade of research on false
confessions shows that interrogators—wittingly or unwittingly—provide
incriminating details about the crime to defendants.174 Also, it is not
uncommon to find that the defendant’s confession does not match the
known facts at the crime scene or the factual information supplied by
other witnesses.175 Though, standing alone, these facts are not a
constitutional grounds for exclusion, the defense will be able to make
effective use of this information to challenge credibility of the

169. HOOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 10.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)–(B)(ii); Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, What Is the
Accused’s “Statement” Subject to State Court Criminal Discovery, 57 A.L.R.4th 827 (1987),
Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2017).
174. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations,
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 16-17 (2010).
175. Id. at 170.
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confession at trial. One study found that 27% of DNA exonerations
involved false confessions.176 Therefore, in cases involving the use of a
custodial confession, the Brady checklist should include the following
categories of information:
1. Any information that any inculpatory statement of the
defendant is inconsistent with the physical evidence recovered
from the crime scene.
2. Any information that there were initial denials of involvement
by the defendant in any or all of the criminal activity alleged
3. Exculpatory statements by the defendant, whether oral,
written, or recorded.
4. Any information that the defendant was suffering from
physical pain, injury, mental, or emotional impairment at the
time the statement was made, whether or not such condition was
caused by the police.
5. Any information that any confession or inculpatory statement
was preceded by prolonged interrogation in violation of
proscribed guidelines.
6. Any information that any statement allegedly made by the
defendant during pretrial interrogation by the government was
not memorialized in an electronic recording.
7. Any information that any police officer involved in the
interrogation has previously been accused of, charged with, or
disciplined for using improper interrogation tactics, including
excessive force, during an interrogation in any case.
8. Any information that any police officer involved in the
interrogation has previously elicited a false confession or falsely
claimed that a defendant made incriminating statements.
9. Any information that the interrogation was not conducted in
accordance with any police department or other guideline,
procedure or standard in the jurisdiction, including mandatory
recording requirements.
d. Forensic Science Errors
Nearly 50% of the first 300 DNA-based exonerations of the
Innocence Project involved inaccurate forensic science testimony.177
Forensic experts have testified in hundreds of cases declaring a “match”
176. West & Meterko, supra note 162, at 732.
177. Id.; see Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to
Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 172-96 (2007) (discussing the nationwide pervasiveness
of forensic science errors is overwhelming and citing investigative reports on the fraud and
misconduct by individual lab technicians and entire forensic labs); see Brief for Olsen as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12-13.
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between some evidence found at the crime scene and the defendant.178
These “matches” were later refuted by DNA evidence or other
information. Commonly, these errors involved serology and hair
analysis.179 The 2009 report from the National Academy of Sciences
raised serious concerns about courts allowing expert forensic testimony
when no standards or protocols exist to support the scientific validity of
the analysis.180 More recently, concerns over the accuracy of forensic
evidence were raised in a 2016 report published by the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. 181 These and other
problems have raised serious concerns about the integrity of non-DNA
forensic evidence.182 Although discovery rules in nearly every
jurisdiction require the prosecution to disclose some combination of the
name, credentials, and summary of the expert opinion to be offered by
any expert witness, in many wrongful conviction cases, prosecutors have
ignored or dismissed evidence that the expert’s testimony was
inaccurate, misleading, or unsupported by the expert’s own scientific
reports.183 In other cases, prosecutors have ignored, and failed to
disclose, systemic fraud, incompetence, and dysfunction in the forensics
lab.184 In addition, prosecutors have concealed complaints and
allegations of incompetence of forensics experts that would have
undermined the credibility of their testimony. Therefore, if the
government intends to rely on non-DNA forensic evidence to prove
guilt, a Brady checklist should query the prosecutor to identify
and disclose:
1. Any results, reports, and opinions obtained from
examinations, tests, and experiments on physical items collected
during the investigation of this case that indicate a lack of
criminal involvement or are otherwise favorable to the
178. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON METHODS 29-31 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf.
179. West & Meterko, supra note 162, at 746 fig.16, 747-49.
180. See Harry T. Edwards & Constantine Gatsonis, Preface to COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE
NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD, at xix-x (2009); COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE
NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., supra, at 85-109.
181. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 175, at 25-38.
182. Gershman, supra note 3, at 553 (“A prosecutor’s failure to carefully scrutinize the
accuracy and credibility of scientific experts, and to search for evidence that would demonstrate the
expert is fabricating or mistaken has been one of the recognized causes of wrongful convictions.”
(footnote omitted)).
183. Id. at 553 & n.116, 554.
184. Id. at 554 & n.118.
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defendant, including any materials that are inconclusive or
identify another person.
2. Any information that tests were not performed in accordance
with lab protocol.
3. Any professional complaints filed against the forensic analyst.
4. Any information that the laboratories where tests were
performed are or were uncertified, below industry standards, or
otherwise not in compliance with state or local laws.
5. Any information that the forensic analyst has given false
testimony, misrepresented findings, or reported findings that
were later refuted by DNA or other evidence.
3. Pretrial Brady Compliance Hearings
In most jurisdictions, pretrial hearings are either authorized or
mandated in criminal cases under local court rules. These hearings
facilitate the resolution of a wide range of discovery and evidentiary
issues. Although in some jurisdictions the court is specifically mandated
to address the Brady disclosure duty during the pretrial hearing,185 in
many other jurisdictions Brady concerns are only addressed when
specifically raised by the defense.186 Trial courts should use the pretrial
hearing to proactively manage the Brady disclosure duty.187 Specifically,
courts should either set a special hearing or designate time during the
regularly scheduled pretrial hearing to engage in a Brady “compliance
inquiry.” During this inquiry, the court should determine whether the
prosecutor has (1) identified all members of the prosecution team; (2)
conducted a thorough inquiry to ascertain whether any member of the
team has favorable information; (3) reviewed all the government’s files
to identify favorable information; and (4) disclosed favorable
information to the defense in a manner that allows the defense to make
effective use of the material. If the court has a detailed standing order on
Brady and/or a Brady checklist, the pretrial hearing should provide the
court with an opportunity to query the prosecutor about specific
categories of favorable information that might exists in the case. This
185. See, e.g., D. MASS. R. 117.1(a)(4)(A) (“[T]he district judge to whom the case is assigned
must . . . convene an initial pretrial conference, which counsel who will conduct the trial must
attend. At the initial pretrial conference the district judge must . . . order the government to
disclose . . . the exculpatory information [under Brady].”); HAW. CRIM. R. 17.1.1(c) (“A magistrate
judge shall conduct at least one pretrial conference . . . . The agenda for the pretrial conference shall
consist of . . . [the] [d]ate of production of evidence favorable to the defendant on the issue of guilt
or punishment, as required by Brady v. Maryland . . . .” (citation omitted) (citing 373 U.S. 83
(1963))).
186. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 22-2002(A) (2002).
187. United States v. Hykes, No. CR 15-4299 JB, 2016 WL 1730125, at *17-18 (D. N.M. Apr.
11, 2016) (discussing the merits of a pretrial hearing to discuss Brady compliance).
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hearing also provides a forum for the prosecutor to request an in camera
review of “questionable” information in their files that could be subject
to disclosure.
The ABA has endorsed the use of pretrial hearings to assist the
court in ensuring compliance with the Brady disclosure duty.188 The
ABA has stated:
Not only will the conference encourage candor . . . [but] if the defense
makes specific requests for material that the prosecution did not think
to seek from law enforcement—not knowing its existence or
recognizing its relevance—such requests may lead to the discovery
of evidence that might otherwise have been inadvertently
non-disclosed.189

Moreover, because criminal discovery is “self-policed” and much
of discovery is conducted off-the-record, pretrial hearings allow courts
to intervene and assist parties in meeting their disclosure obligations.190
The formality of on-the-record pretrial hearings will “add an additional
safeguard against nondisclosure” because parties will “think twice” and
“make doubly sure” they have complied with all disclosure obligations
before making representations to the court.191
In addition, one scholar has proposed that courts engage in the
following “Brady colloquy” during pretrial discovery hearings192:
1. Have you reviewed your file, and the notes and file of any
prosecutors who handled this case before you, to determine if these
materials include information that is favorable to the defense?
2. Have you requested and reviewed the information law enforcement
possesses, including information that may not have been reduced to a
formal written report, to determine if it contains information that is
favorable to the defense?

188. ABA recommendation 102D states the following:
[T]he American Bar Association urges . . . courts to adopt a procedure whereby a
criminal trial court shall conduct, at a reasonable time prior to a criminal trial involving
felony or serious misdemeanor charges, a conference with the parties to ensure that they
are fully aware of their respective disclosure obligations . . . and to offer the court’s
assistance in resolving disputes over disclosure obligations.
ABA Recommendation 104A Adopted by the House of Delegates (Feb. 8-9, 2010).
189. Id. at 3.
190. Id. at 1-2.
191. Id. at 3.
192. Jason Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 50-51 (2014); see
Sullivan & Possley, supra note 162, at 929-30 (noting the Brady colloquy). But see Hykes, 2016
WL 1730125, at *16-18 (questioning the effectiveness of the colloquy in every case).
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3. Have you identified information that is favorable to the defense, but
nonetheless elected not to disclose this information because you
believe that the defense is already aware of the information or the
information is not material?
4. Are you aware that this state’s rules of professional conduct require
you to disclose all information known to the prosecutor that tends to be
favorable to the defense regardless of whether the material meets the
Brady materiality standard?193

Brady compliance hearings allow the court to regulate and manage
the Brady disclosure duty while the prosecution remains in control of the
criminal evidence. Because the court has a right to rely on
representations made by litigants during court proceedings,194
prosecutors can be held accountable for making misrepresentations to
the court about the nonexistence of Brady information within their
possession, as well as their failure to investigate and identify favorable
information in the possession of members of the prosecution team.195 In
addition, active engagement by the trial judge can begin changing the
culture of resistance to the Brady disclosure duty by making the process
more formal and transparent.196
4. Brady Certification Requirement
Another administrative tool that trial judges could utilize is courtordered certification of compliance with Brady. In some jurisdictions,
certification is mandated by local discovery rules.197 In other instances,
local and federal courts have mandated certification in response to Brady
violations.198 If courts adopt a certification requirement, courts should
193. Kreag, supra note 192.
194. See United States v. Fallen, 498 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting that the
government’s misrepresentation allows the government to foreclose the court’s discretionary
authority because “the government attempted to become prosecutor and judge”); Rosser v. United
States, 381 A.2d 598, 605 (D.C. 1977) (“‘In open court, the court has the right to rely on the
truthfulness of the government’s statements.’ So does defense counsel.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Fallen, 498 F.2d at 174)); see also United States v. Lewis, 511 F.2d 798, 800-01 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1975); United States v. Wilkerson, 456 F.2d 57, 61 (6th Cir. 1972).
195. In re Stuart, 803 N.Y.S.2d 577, 578 (App. Div. 2005) (ordering a three-year suspension of
the prosecutor from practice of law for making misrepresentations to the judge regarding his
knowledge of the whereabouts of a Brady witness).
196. See Symposium, supra note 15, at 2031-34.
197. See, e.g., MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(E)(3) (“Certificate of Compliance. When a party has
provided all discovery required by this rule or by court order, it shall file with the court a Certificate
of Compliance. The certificate shall state that, to the best of its knowledge and after reasonable
inquiry, the party has disclosed and made available all items subject to discovery other than reports
of experts, and shall identify each item provided.”).
198. Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing the conviction based on
Brady misconduct and directing the government to “provide a statement under oath from a relevant
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use a detailed Brady checklist and require members of the prosecution
team to certify that they have checked their files for each and every
category of favorable information listed and certify that responsive
information has been disclosed or does not exist. A general, blanket
certification—such as, “I hereby certify that I have disclosed all
information required by Brady”—does little to ensure that the
prosecution team has fully complied with all that Brady demands.
There are several benefits to requiring a standard written
certification in all cases. First, the court can use written certifications to
ensure the government has complied with its obligation to learn of any
favorable information in the possession of any member of the
prosecution team. This requirement will reduce Brady violations that
result from prosecutors either not performing a due diligence inquiry or
not including all members of the prosecution team in its constitutionally
mandated search for favorable information.
Second, if trial courts require police officers and other members of
the prosecution team to file a written certification of compliance with
Brady, the trial judge could reduce the number of Brady violations that
stem from the intentional or negligent suppression of favorable
information by police officers. Police certification requirements would
also allow the court to educate police officers on Brady or reinforce the
policies or general orders on Brady that may exist within their police
department. Moreover, false certification could subject police officers to
judicial sanctions. While some prosecutors and police officers might be
willing to risk Brady misconduct if there is a good chance that their
misdeeds will not be discovered, far fewer would be willing to file false
statements with the court that could subject them to sanctions.
The administrative tools discussed above provide trial judges with
the resources needed to manage and regulate the Brady disclosure duty
and disrupt the current culture of non-compliance. When coupled with
the use of the sanctions, discussed below, trial courts can create strong
incentives for the government to disclose favorable information in
their possession.

police official certifying that all of the records have been disclosed”); United States v. Naegele, 468
F. Supp. 2d 150, 155 (D.D.C. 2007) (compelling the disclosure of Brady material from the
government and ordering the government to conduct a thorough and diligent search for the Brady
material requested by the defense and “certify to the Court in writing” that it has complied); see
Vaughn v. United States, 93 A.3d 1237, 1266-67 (D.C. 2014) (reversing the conviction due to
Brady violation and stating that the government had never represented that it had fulfilled its
disclosure duties and “the government should be directed to make such a representation, in writing,
filed with the trial court”).
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B. Systemic Judicial Reform of the Brady Disclosure Duty
There are systemic Brady reforms that trial and appellate courts can
institute to reform the Brady disclosure duty. By amending the court
rules to specifically address the Brady disclosure duty, instituting
mandatory Brady training for litigants in criminal cases, and establishing
“best practices” for litigants, the judiciary can effectively remove the
barriers that impede the Brady disclosure duty.
1. Codifying the Brady Disclosure Duty in a Court Rule
For the past three years, I have worked with a team of experienced
litigators and judges to create a court rule to codify the Brady disclosure
duty.199 We have met regularly, utilized research on Brady criminal
discovery rules adopted by other federal and state courts across the
country, sought input from the local bar,200 and faced staunch resistance
from the Department of Justice. The committee has compromised and
altered the proposed rule to address concerns raised by a wide range of
stakeholders.201 We have learned that creating a Brady rule that all
criminal justice stakeholders can embrace is virtually impossible.
Although prior attempts to amend the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to codify the Brady disclosure duty have failed, state and
federal courts should still seek to craft a rule to clarify the ambiguity in
the Brady doctrine. Unlike the set of criminal discovery management
tools set forth for individual judges, a court rule will apply to all criminal
cases in the jurisdiction and hold all prosecutors to a uniform standard of
practice in every case.
A Brady rule should, at a minimum, clarify the scope of the duty to
disclose favorable information and the categories of favorable
information—exculpatory, impeaching, and mitigating. The rule should
also provide clear timelines on when the government must disclose
Brady material to the defense and specify the format for disclosure—
summaries or original source documents. The court rule should also
have sanctions that the trial judge can impose if the disclosure
obligations are not met. The most comprehensive Brady rule is one
adopted by the United States District Court of Massachusetts.202 This
rule should be the starting point for any court seeking to use a rulemaking process to regulate and manage the Brady disclosure duty.
199. The author is a member of the Special Ad Hoc Committee on Criminal Disclosure
Obligations for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
200. D.D.C. Proposed Disclosure R., 144 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 197 (Jan. 29, 2016).
201. D.D.C. Proposed Disclosure R. (Nov. 2017 Notice), http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/sites/
dcd/files/Nov2017NoticeProposedBradyRule.pdf.
202. D. MASS. R. 116 (2008); see also HOOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 9-10.
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2. Changing the Culture of Prosecutorial Resistance and
Noncompliance with Brady
While most of the responsibility for implementing Brady reform
will be shouldered by trial court judges, appellate courts can also play a
vital role in the management and regulation of the Brady disclosure duty.
Two opinions by the local and federal appellate courts in the District of
Columbia illustrate the impact that appellate courts can have on systemic
reform of criminal discovery practices.
In 1971, in Rosser v. United States, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals suggested a practice that fundamentally changed criminal
discovery practices in the District.203 The defendant allegedly admitted
to the police after his arrest that he was a “con man.”204 Although the
prosecution never disclosed the “con man” statement during discovery,
the government was allowed, over the defense’s objection, to use the
statement to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony.205 The government
argued, among other things, that the defense never requested the
statement, as then required under the local discovery rule.206 The defense
attorney countered that he had made a general oral request for discovery
“sufficient to cover any statement by his client.”207 The defense’s
discovery request was never memorialized and the original prosecutor
assigned to the case was no longer with the prosecutor’s office by the
time the case went to trial.208 Although the court found that there was
insufficient evidence that the defense ever requested discovery, the court
also noted that several representations made by the prosecutor in court
misled the court and the defense into believing that the government had
no statements of the defendant.209 The court ultimately reversed, but also
took notice of a pattern of prior cases in which the government used
previously undisclosed statements of defendants to impeach the
defendants’ testimony.210 In so doing, the court stated:
We suggest that the most effective way of making and responding to a
Rule 16 request in the context of the required informal discovery is for
defense counsel to deliver a letter or “request” document to the
prosecutor specifying the types of material desired, and for the
prosecutor to confirm in writing either that all such material has been
produced or that certain material is being withheld pending a court
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

381 A.2d 598, 605-09 (D.C. 1977).
Id. at 600.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 604.
Id.
Id. at 604-05.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 608-09.
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determination at defendant’s instance. While such a written exchange
is not required by the rule, this case should make clear why that
approach is highly desirable. A similar procedure is advisable for
informal handling of Jencks Act requests. 211

Although this “suggestion” by the court was mere dicta in the
court’s opinion, the defense bar adopted the court’s suggestion.
Following Rosser, it has now become standard practice in the District of
Columbia for the defense to file what is locally referred to as a “Rosser
letter” in every case to memorialize pretrial discovery requests made to
the prosecution.212 This practice has brokered a resolution of many
routine criminal discovery disputes and halted a strategic trial tactic by
the prosecution that the court deemed to be unfair to the defense.
Similarly, appellate courts could “suggest” practice standards to
reform the Brady disclosure duty. For example, while Agurs makes clear
that the government must disclose favorable information even in the
absence of a demand by the defense, many have suggested that a specific
Brady demand by the defense, similar to the Rosser letter, might
significantly improve the delivery of Brady material.213 Likewise,
appellate courts might suggest that prosecutors make all Brady
disclosures in writing, and file a copy with the court. While it is not the
role of appellate courts to manage trial discovery or reform discovery
practices, appellate courts have a stake in ensuring that constitutional
rights are not routinely violated because of ambiguities in what
Brady demands.
The same year that Rosser was decided, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit “nudged” the government
to significantly overhaul its discovery practices to comply with the
Jencks Act.214 In United States v. Bryant,215 law enforcement officials
made an audio recording of the defendant engaging in a drug transaction
with an undercover officer.216 The defense made a pretrial request for the
audio recording which captured both the words of the defendant and the
officer and was, therefore, discoverable under both the Jencks Act and

211. Id. at 610.
212. See, e.g., Zanders v. United States, 999 A.2d 149, 161 n.17 (D.C. 2010).
213. JaneAnne Murray, The Brady Battle, 37 CHAMPION, May 2013, at 72, 73; see
Symposium, supra note 15, at 2021-22 (proposing Brady “checklists” for defense lawyers).
214. The Jencks Act mandates government disclosure of all “substantially verbatim” recorded
pretrial statements of witnesses after the witness has testified at trial. Pub. L. No. 85-296, 71 Stat.
595, 595-96 (1974) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b), (e)(2) (2012)).
215. 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), on remand, 331 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C), and aff’d, 448 F.2d 1182
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
216. Id. at 645-46.
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.217 When the government
reported that the tape was intentionally not preserved by the law
enforcement officers who were unaware of the Jencks disclosure
obligations, the court sharply criticized the government’s “thoroughly
unstructured” approach to preserving criminal discovery, calling it “a
dark no-man’s-land of unreviewed bureaucratic and discretionary
decision-making.”218 As in Rosser, the court noted the number of cases
involving lost or intentionally unpreserved materials.219 The court
proposed a prophylactic discovery reform and required the government
to demonstrate in future cases that the government has
promulgated, enforced and attempted in good faith to follow rigorous
and systematic procedures designed to preserve all discoverable
evidence gathered in the course of a criminal investigation . . . .
. . . . By requiring that the discretionary authority of investigative
agents be controlled by regular procedures . . . we intend to ensure that
rights recognized at one stage of the criminal process will not be
undercut at other, less visible, stages. 220

The admonition by the Bryant court led to systemic reform in the
preservation and disclosure of witness statements in the District of
Columbia. Following Bryant, the local police department developed and
instituted standard operating procedures for police officers to preserve
pretrial statements subject to disclosure under the Jencks Act.221
Much like the “dark no-man’s-land of unreviewed bureaucratic and
discretionary decision-making”222 that impeded the implementation of
the Jencks Act, the government has not taken steps to ensure that police
officers preserve, maintain, and disclose favorable information collected
during the course of their investigation as mandated by Brady.223 Also,
as discussed below, many police departments do not have training on
Brady, nor do they have specific policies and procedures in place to
ensure that Brady material is properly identified and preserved. Thus, the
due diligence requirements imposed by Kyles are easily thwarted by the
untrained police officers.
With each successive case involving government suppression of
favorable information, reviewing courts either reverse the conviction or
find error and sustain the conviction without taking affirmative steps to
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 646-47.
Id. at 644, 646-47.
Id. at 650-53.
Id. at 652.
See Jones, supra note 163, at 2909-10, 2924 nn.184, 185.
Bryant, 439 F.2d at 644.
Jones, supra note 163, at 2900 n.31, 2914-15.
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reform Brady disclosure practices. The type of “suggestions,”
“directives,” and “practice pointers” made by the appellate courts in
Rosser and Bryant that reformed criminal discovery practices in the
District of Columbia could also prove effective in reforming the Brady
disclosure duty.
3. Training
Another critical measure that courts can take to change the culture
of resistance and noncompliance is comprehensive training on Brady.
Trial and appellate court judges could work with law schools and local
bar associations to develop a rigorous Brady training course to ensure
that all litigants in criminal cases—especially all members of the
prosecution team—are fully informed of the basic tenets of the Brady
doctrine. While prosecutors offer a number of different excuses for
nondisclosure of favorable evidence, a common excuse is, “Your Honor,
I did not know this was Brady material.” In instances where the
prosecutor is new and/or there has been no comprehensive training on
Brady provided by the prosecuting authority, ignorance of the Brady
disclosure duty might explain the first nondisclosure. Likewise, given
the ambiguities in the Brady doctrine, confusion over the scope of
disclosure mandated by Brady might also explain nondisclosure by more
seasoned prosecutors. For this reason, courts have a vested interest in
ensuring that prosecutors know what the Constitution requires and how
to meet these requirements. The stakes of nondisclosure are too high for
courts to continue to allow ignorance of what Brady commands to be an
acceptable “defense” to the nondisclosure of favorable information.
Ideally, Brady training should be comprehensive and mandatory.
Professor Gershman has created a “Brady Training Program Course
Syllabus” which should prove helpful to the court in implementing a
Brady training sanction.224 Professor Gershman’s materials include a list
of the Supreme Court’s Brady cases, a synopsis of the Brady
jurisprudence, and a detailed discussion of each category of “favorable”
evidence.225 Professor Gershman also includes a series of hypothetical
fact patterns that could be used to teach the proper application of the
Brady doctrine.226 These materials could easily form the foundation for a
Brady training course, supplemented with the Brady precedent and rules
of the local courts.

224. See Gershman, supra note 118, at 533-44.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 544-49.
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With a mandatory Brady training program, it will be difficult for
members of the prosecution team to claim ignorance of what Brady
demands. Completion of the training course erodes both the
reasonableness and the plausibility of nondisclosure of Brady material
based on the prosecutor’s failure to appreciate that the information was
subject to disclosure, especially if the trial court employs the range of
administrative tools discussed in Part III to regulate the disclosure of
favorable information.
IV.

JUDICIAL SANCTIONS FOR BRADY MISCONDUCT

When a public official behaves with such casual disregard for
his constitutional obligations and the rights of the accused, it
erodes the public’s trust in our justice system, and chips away
at the foundational premises of the rule of law. When such
transgressions are acknowledged yet forgiven by the
courts, we endorse and invite their repetition.227
– Judge Alex Kozinski

The judicial regulations and management initiatives discussed
above will be ineffective—and largely ignored—unless the court also
utilizes sanctions to redress the suppression of favorable information by
the prosecution. Courts must not make it so easy for prosecutors to
succumb to the temptation to suppress Brady information. Courts must
take steps to force prosecutors to reach the conclusion that it is far easier
to comply with the Brady disclosure duty than risk the sanctions
that the court will impose. This assessment will only be reached by
prosecutors if courts institute a range of sanctions designed to hold
prosecutors accountable and deter would-be violators of the Brady
disclosure duty.228
The past four decades of Brady litigation have not resulted in the
consistent imposition of sanctions on prosecutors for Brady misconduct.
Even when trial judges believe the prosecutor’s Brady misconduct
warrants the imposition of sanctions, judges often refer the matter to an
extrajudicial entity—either the prosecuting authority or the state bar—
for disciplinary action.229 While these third-party referrals for
227. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
228. See United States v. Tavera, 719 F.3d 705, 714 (6th Cir. 2013) (vacating the district court
judgment based on Brady misconduct and stating that “[w]e do not want other prosecutors to imitate
the prosecutor’s conduct in this case. Brady . . . d[oes] not require the defendant to discover such
undisclosed statements laying in the prosecutor’s file”).
229. See, e.g., id. at 707-08 (“[W]e recommend that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern
District of Tennessee conduct an investigation of why this prosecutorial error occurred and make
sure that such Brady violations do not continue.”); see also United States v. Bartko, 728 F.3d 327,

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

43

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 8

130

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:87

disciplinary action can sometimes be effective in redressing Brady
misconduct,230 exclusive reliance on outside entities results in the court’s
inability to control the unconstitutional behavior of prosecutors that
occurs during the litigation before the court. Moreover, reliance on
extrajudicial sanctions has not proved effective in deterring Brady
misconduct. Even in cases of egregious Brady violations or persistent
patterns of Brady violations by individual prosecutors, deferral of
sanctions to third-party disciplinary authorities has not resulted in
consistent sanctions nor have such referrals stemmed the tide of
Brady violations.231
In United States v. Jones, the trial judge expressed palpable
frustration when the prosecutor failed to review her own notes and
disclose the fact that a government witness, on several occasions, made
statements to the prosecutor that directly contradicted the witness’s trial
testimony.232 The court characterized the prosecutor’s Brady violation as
“serious and repeated”233 and part of “a dismal history of intentional and
inadvertent violations of the government’s duties to disclose.”234 After
noting the ineffectiveness of the Department of Justice’s procedures for
policing Brady misconduct,235 the court stated: “[I]t is now particularly
important that judges find effective means to themselves hold
prosecutors and other government officials accountable.”236

342 (4th Cir. 2013) (“To underscore our seriousness about this matter, and to ensure that the
[Brady] problems are addressed, we direct the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this opinion upon
the Attorney General of the United States and the Office of Professional Responsibility for the
Department of Justice.”).
230. See, e.g., In re Howes, 52 A.3d 1, 25 (D.C. 2012) (ordering that federal prosecutor be
disbarred for Brady and related misconduct); Press Release, David W. Prater, Dist. Att’y, Okla. Cty.
(undated) (on file with author) (stating that district attorney terminated two prosecutors for
withholding Brady evidence and referred them to the state bar association for disciplinary action,
and to the Oklahoma Attorney General’s Office for investigation of possible criminal violations);
Alexa Ura, Anderson to Serve 9 Days in Jail, Give Up Law License as Part of Deal, TEX. TRIB.
(Nov. 8, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.texastribune.org/2013/11/08/ken-anderson-serve-jail-timegive-law-license (former Texas prosecutor convicted and sentenced to ten days in jail for
intentionally withholding Brady evidence that resulted in the wrongful conviction of Michael
Morton).
231. See United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 176-78 (D. Mass. 2009).
232. Id. at 178-79.
233. Id. at 180.
234. Id. at 165 (quoting United States v. Jones, 609 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119 (D. Mass), modified,
620 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Mass. 2009)).
235. Id. at 166-67 (“The persistent recurrence of inadvertent violations of defendants’
constitutional right to discovery in the District of Massachusetts persuades this court that it is
insufficient to rely on Department of Justice training programs for prosecutors alone to assure that
the government’s obligation to produce certain information to defendants is understood and
properly discharged.”).
236. Id. at 176-77.
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As expressed by Judge Wolf, there are compelling reasons for trial
courts to take on the primary role of imposing sanctions for Brady
misconduct. First, trial courts are ideally suited to impose sanctions for
Brady misconduct.237 In the course of determining whether the
prosecutor suppressed favorable evidence that “undermined confidence
in the verdict,” the trial court must necessarily make the factual findings
relevant to the imposition of sanctions. Moreover, the prosecutor’s act of
depriving the fact finder of critical evidence simultaneously deprives the
court of the opportunity to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Beyond the
adverse impact on the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial,
Brady misconduct corrupts the truth-seeking function of the trial and has
an overall corrosive impact on the efficacy and integrity of the criminal
adjudication process. Judges lose the ability to control the admissibility
of evidence, and juries are forced to make guilt/innocence
determinations without the benefit of critical facts. Brady violations are
also antithetical to the court’s strong interest in judicial efficiency.
Whether Brady misconduct surfaces pretrial, during trial, or post-trial,
courts will be required to expend judicial resources to adjudicate the
Brady violations and assess the net impact of the offending conduct on
the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Courts must, therefore, hold
prosecutors accountable when the actions of the prosecutor result in the
denial of constitutional rights and undermine the effectiveness of the
judicial process.
A. Judicial Authority to Sanction Brady Misconduct
Unlike the Jencks Act and other criminal discovery rules,238 the
Brady disclosure duty does not have prescribed sanctions for
noncompliance. The power to impose sanctions for Brady misconduct
stems from the court’s broad inherent supervisory power to implement a
remedy for violation of a recognized constitutional right and/or deter
future illegal conduct.239 The Supreme Court has recognized that the

237. See United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Although it may be
difficult . . . to draw the line between zealous advocacy and unacceptable courtroom tactics, the line
must be drawn, and the district courts are better able to draw it in the first instance.” (citation
omitted) (citing United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338, 1343 (2d Cir. 1991))).
238. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2) (stating that a court may compel discovery, grant
continuance, exclude evidence or “enter any other order that is just under the circumstances”), with
18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (2012) (noting that a court can strike testimony as a sanction of nondisclosure
of a witness statement).
239. See United States v. Fitzgerald, 615 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159-62 (S.D. Cal. 2009)
(exercising inherent supervisory power to redress Brady violation); see also Chambers v. Nasco,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44, 46 (1991).
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inherent supervisory powers encompass the authority to impose
disciplinary sanctions on attorneys who appear before the court.240
There are very few published opinions involving judicially-imposed
sanctions to punish and deter Brady violations by prosecutors. Unlike
other discovery misconduct regulated by statute, a court can impose
sanctions pursuant to its inherent supervisory powers even in the absence
of a finding that the prosecutor’s actions were undertaken in bad faith.241
Moreover, because Brady is violated regardless of whether the
prosecutor intentionally, recklessly, or negligently withheld favorable
evidence, a bad faith restriction on the court’s authority to sanction
Brady misconduct would insulate many violations of the Brady
disclosure duty. Also, if trial judges adopt some or all of the regulatory
tools discussed in Part III, there should be fewer and fewer good faith
Brady violations because prosecutors will be on notice of the full scope
of their Brady disclosure duty at the outset of the litigation.
The primary vehicle that courts have to redress Brady violations
and other forms of attorney misconduct during litigation is the contempt
power. The Supreme Court has held that courts have the inherent
authority to invoke the contempt power as a punitive sanction to
“vindicate the authority of the court.”242 Federal judges also have
statutory authority to hold lawyers in criminal contempt pursuant to
federal statutes and Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.243 State judges also enjoy the broad authority to impose
contempt sanctions on errant lawyers.244 The contempt power of the
courts, however, is generally reserved for intentional misconduct and
courts are cautioned to exercise this authority “with restraint and
240. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-51.
241. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 635-36 (1962) (suggesting no finding
of bad faith is required before courts impose sanctions for attorney misconduct, as neglect justified
the sanctions imposed by the lower court); Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43
F.3d 65, 74 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that bad faith is not required before a court imposes a
sanction on an attorney under its inherent supervisory powers); Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255,
1259-60 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that bad faith is required to impose sanctions under
a court’s inherent supervisory powers); see Redfield v. Ystalyfera Iron Co., 110 U.S. 174, 176-77
(1884) (imposing a sanction on an attorney for misconduct absent bad faith finding); see also
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 58-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since necessity does not depend upon a
litigant’s state of mind, the inherent sanctioning power must extend to situations involving less than
bad faith. For example, a court has the power to dismiss when counsel fails to appear for trial, even
if this is a consequence of negligence rather than bad faith.”).
242. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828-29 (1994)
(quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911)).
243. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 42.
244. See, e.g., State v. Schiewe, 673 N.E.2d 941, 943 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that
the state court has the inherent power to hold a prosecutor in contempt but finding insufficient
evidence to support the sanction).
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discretion.”245 Instead, judges are advised to “deploy[] the least extreme
sanction reasonably calculated to achieve the appropriate punitive and
deterrent purposes.”246 Although criminal contempt is not an appropriate
or viable alternative for every—or even most—Brady misconduct, there
are reported state court opinions holding prosecutors in contempt to
sanction Brady violations.247 Notably, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan initiated
contempt proceedings against the prosecutors in United States v. Stevens
for the wide range of egregious Brady misconduct committed throughout
the trial.248
B. Non-Contempt Brady Sanctions
Given the traditional reluctance of courts to impose sanctions for
Brady violations and the importance of having sanctions to punish and
deter Brady misconduct, it is critical for courts to have “an array of
options, ranging from criminal contempt to non-contempt measures.”249
Proposed below are three non-contempt alternative sanctions that trial
courts can impose to punish and deter Brady misconduct.250 These
sanctions serve to enforce the regulatory tools proposed above and
provide the court with a measured and effective means of holding
prosecutors accountable for Brady violations.
1. Brady Violation Database
Trial courts should establish an internal database for all judges on
the court to log and track Brady violations committed by each prosecutor
before any judge on the court. At a minimum, the database should
include the name of the prosecutor, the case name, the specific category
of favorable evidence withheld, the prosecutor’s proffered justification
for nondisclosure, and the sanction imposed. If no sanction was
imposed, the database should state the reason the trial judge did not
245. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45.
246. United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1999).
247. See, e.g., State v. Khong, 502 N.E.2d 682, 687-88, 693 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (noting that
the prosecutor failed to provide defendant with exculpatory reports and holding the prosecutor in
contempt because the prosecutor failed to comply with a court order to produce the requested
documents in discovery). But see Brophy v. Comm. on Prof’l Standards, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819
(App. Div. 1981) (censuring the prosecutor after a Brady violation).
248. See Neil A. Lewis, Prosecutors in Stevens Case Are Ruled in Contempt, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/14/us/politics/14stevens.html; see also Notice of Filing
of Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 17-19. The special prosecutor appointed by
the court to investigate the conduct of the lawyers ultimately found that, although their conduct was
egregious, the court could not hold them in contempt because they did not violate a clear order of
the court. Id. at 513-14.
249. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d at 8; see Sullivan & Possley, supra note 162, at 907-08.
250. See infra Part IV.B.
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impose a sanction. Armed with this information, courts can monitor
compliance with Brady and establish norms for the imposition
of sanctions.
The database would also be a valuable administrative and
management tool for the trial court. When a prosecutor suppresses
favorable evidence before or during trial, the trial judge orders
disclosure and there may be no published opinion or written record of
the violation. Further, when a defendant is acquitted and there is no
appeal, Brady misconduct discovered during the trial may not be
memorialized. As a result, the Brady violation is “invisible” to other
judges on the court. The database will ensure that all of the trial judges
know whether a prosecutor or other member of the prosecution team has
previously engaged in Brady misconduct. This will prevent the same
prosecutor from appearing before different judges, engaging in the same
Brady misconduct, and either offering the same excuses for
nondisclosure or repeatedly professing ignorance of the scope of
disclosure required under Brady. Moreover, each trial judge will be able
to refer to the database at the outset of the litigation and determine
pretrial whether, based on the prosecutor’s past discovery practices, the
court should provide greater oversight and scrutiny of her actions.
Beyond use of the database in specific cases, this tool also allows
the court to determine whether the court rules, standing orders, and other
Brady management tools are effective in curbing Brady violations. The
database might show a pattern of the same type of Brady misconduct
which could prompt the court to amend its standing orders or conduct
training to clarify a common misunderstanding among practitioners.
The database would also be a valuable sanctioning tool. The
database gives trial judges the critical information needed to determine
whether to impose a sanction on a particular prosecutor for a Brady
violation. The judge will be able to see whether the actions of the
prosecutor reflect a singular, isolated lapse in judgment or a persistent
pattern of Brady misconduct. The database will likewise inform the
court’s discretionary determination of the severity of sanctions to be
imposed for the Brady violation. Serial Brady violators should, of
course, face stiffer sanctions, especially if the prosecutor has engaged in
the same or similar Brady misconduct and has previously been
sanctioned. Prosecutors should be made aware of the existence of the
Brady violation database and told when their conduct is memorialized in
the database. Knowledge of this information could serve as a deterrent
for Brady misconduct.
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2. Public Reprimand
When prosecutors are reckless, intentionally suppress favorable
information to gain a tactical advantage in the litigation, or engage in a
pattern of negligent Brady violations, courts should impose sanctions on
the prosecutor. A public reprimand by the trial court is a low-level
sanction available to the court.
Traditionally, published trial and appellate opinions on Brady
violations or other forms of prosecutorial misconduct omit the name of
the prosecutor who committed the misdeed.251 This grant of anonymity
is perhaps a professional courtesy appropriate for members of the bar
who, despite their best efforts have made an error.252 This privilege
should not be accorded routinely. As one court noted, “A risk of
professional stigma surely attends most sanction orders, since sanction
either explicitly or implicitly impugns counsel’s professional ethics or
competence.”253 The public reprimand is specifically designed to achieve
this purpose.254 When courts identify the offending prosecutor by name
in a published opinion, it subjects the prosecutor to public
embarrassment and diminishes her standing within the legal
community.255 The impact of a public reprimand is far greater, however,
in the digital age. It is highly likely that the prosecutor’s misdeeds will
be known nationally due to the expansive scope of online search engines
and websites devoted exclusively to documenting prosecutorial
misconduct.256 Also, the public reprimand sanction will undoubtedly
have an adverse impact on the prosecutor’s future employment
opportunities and foreclose some opportunities for public office. Though
the public reprimand is a much less severe sanction than criminal
contempt, the scope and magnitude of these adverse consequences
should make it a very effective sanction for punishing Brady misconduct
and deterring other prosecutors. Several courts have used public
251. See United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 175 (D. Mass. 2009).
252. Id. (“[r]ecognizing that published criticism of a named prosecutor may haunt the attorney,
this court has refrained from memorializing in writing” the attorney’s name in a published opinion).
253. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d at 12.
254. See Jerry P. Coleman & Jordan Lockey, Brady “Epidemic” Misdiagnosis: Claims of
Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Sanctions to Deter It, 50 U. S.F. L. REV. 199, 243 (2016).
255. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 381, 404 (2002) (“Most obviously, judges on rare occasion criticize a prosecutor’s behavior
in a written opinion . . . . While these methods do not actually set any standards or exact any
economic toll, they serve to embarrass the prosecutor and encourage him and others to refrain from
similar conduct in the future.” (footnote omitted)).
256. See, e.g., Open File, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT & ACCOUNTABILITY,
http://www.prosecutorialaccountability.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2017); Registry Database, CTR.
FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/registry/database (last visited Oct.
21, 2017).
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reprimands to redress Brady misconduct.257 Other courts have stated
their intention to use public reprimand sanctions in future cases to
redress Brady violations.258
3. Banishment or Suspension
A New York trial judge barred an assistant district attorney from
appearing before him upon learning that she failed to disclose Brady
material in a rape case.259 The prosecutor in a sexual assault case before
Judge John Wilson failed to disclose the fact that the accuser initially
reported to the police that sex with the defendant was consensual.260 By
the time this Brady misconduct was discovered, the defendant had been
held in pretrial detention for more than eight months and closing
arguments had concluded in the two-week trial.261 In dismissing the
charges, the trial judge characterized the prosecutor’s Brady misconduct
as “an utter and complete disgrace—not just for you, but for your office
in general.”262 The judge then told the prosecutor to remain standing
and stated:
Here are your sanctions: You’re going to leave this room, and you’re
never going to come back. You can’t appear before me anymore. I’ll
tell you why, because I can’t trust anything you say or do. I can’t
believe you. I can’t believe your credibility anymore. The only thing a
lawyer ever has to offer is their integrity and their credibility, and

257. United States v. Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1323-25 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (using its
inherent supervisory power to issue a public reprimand against United States Attorney’s Office and
three Assistant United States Attorneys for Brady misconduct), vacated, 652 F.3d 1297, 1317-18
(11th Cir. 2011) (finding the trial court violated the civil rights of prosecutors by imposing public
reprimands as a sanction without giving them notice and an opportunity to respond to misconduct
allegations), rh’g denied, 676 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2012); see, e.g., People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673,
684-94, 697-700 (Cal. 1998) (naming the offending prosecutor and discussing previous instances
wherein the same prosecutor was criticized for misconduct); McGuire v. State, 677 P.2d 1060,
1062-64 (Nev. 1984) (per curiam) (identifying the prosecutor and citing two other instances of
similar misconduct by the prosecutor).
258. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 766-67 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v.
Helmandollar, 852 F.2d 498, 502 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting public reprimand as an option available
to the court); United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 175 (D. Mass. 2009) (“[P]rosecutors
should now foresee that they will likely be named in published decisions if this court is convinced
that they have engaged in misconduct.”); Ferrara v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 2d 384, 429 (D.
Mass. 2005).
259. Denis Slattery, Bronx Prosecutor Bashed and Barred from Courtroom for Misconduct,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6, 2014, 2:01 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/bronxprosecutor-barred-courtroom-article-1.1746238 (including link to the transcript of the court
proceeding).
260. Id. (Tr. at 20-21).
261. Id.
262. Id.
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when you have lost that, there is no purpose in your appearing before
this Court.263

It is well-established that judges have the inherent supervisory
authority to punish Brady misconduct by barring lawyers from appearing
before the judge in any future cases.264 This “banishment” or suspension
sanction has been imposed in a number of criminal cases against defense
attorneys and prosecutors for Brady and other forms of misconduct.265
In most jurisdictions, prosecutors practice in a specific courthouse
and appear before the same set of criminal court judges on a regular
basis. In some jurisdictions, prosecutors are assigned to a specific
courtroom or a specific judge’s calendar and will appear before the same
judge for months at a time. Regardless of the staffing practices,
prosecutors will inevitably be required to make court appearances before
the same set of judges many times during their career. When a trial judge
finds that a prosecutor has engaged in Brady misconduct, the judge has
the power to refuse to allow the prosecutor to handle matters before the
judge in any future litigation. The impact of this sanction on the
prosecutor is profound. This sanction could force the prosecuting
authority to reassign or terminate the prosecutor’s employment. The
sanction may also have collateral consequences if local court rules
permit the judge to initiate proceedings to completely suspend the
prosecutor from practicing law in the court.266
263. Bronx ADA Megan Teesdale: Integrity Lost, SIMPLE JUSTICE: A CRIMINAL DEFENSE
BLOG (Apr. 8, 2014), https://blog.simplejustice.us/2014/04/08/bronx-ada-megan-teesdale-integritylost.
264. See id. at *1-2, *5-6 (affirming the decision of several judges on the bankruptcy court to
suspend an attorney from practicing in the bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of Virginia for a
wide range of conduct, including the failure to timely file motions, properly advise clients, and
filing documents with false statements). In upholding the suspension, the Eastern District Court of
Virginia recognized the inherent power of the court to discipline lawyers who appear before the
court, including the ability to suspend lawyers when warranted. Id. at *5-6.
265. See, e.g., United States v. Wittig, No. 03-40142, 2005 WL 758606, at *8, *22 (D. Kan.
Apr. 4, 2005) (noting that one of the attorneys on the defense team in a criminal case was barred
during the trial and barred from appearing before the court on re-trial based on the lawyer’s
“blatantly hostile behavior directed at the Court”); cf. Petition for Writs of Prohibition, Certiorari
and (If Necessary) Mandamus and Motion for Emergency and Accelerated Consideration at 1-2,
Tolleson v. Circuit Court, No. 2011-1 (Ark. June 30, 2011), https://www.arktimes.com/images/
blogimages/2011/07/05/1309885067-tollesonpetition.pdf (filing for writ of prohibition against judge
who entered an order removing and disqualifying himself from any proceeding in which Deputy
Public Defender Julie C. Tolleson was representing a party in any case pending or filed in the
future). But see In re Jefferson, 753 So. 2d 181, 191 (La. 2000) (stating that the judge abused his
discretion in banishing the prosecutor until he apologized and that this “constituted an extreme and
unwarranted abuse of judicial authority” and “[his] actions went beyond the bounds of acceptable
judicial behavior”).
266. See, e.g., In re Parker, No. 3:14cv241, 2014 WL 4809844, at *1-2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 26,
2014).
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In sum, the sanctions proposed here provide the court with effective
options to redress Brady misconduct without relying on extra-judicial
entities to enforce the Brady disclosure duty and without resorting to the
drastic sanction of contempt. These sanctions are easy to administer and
are properly calibrated to punish the offending prosecutor and deter
other prosecutors from Brady misconduct.
V.

CONCLUSION

Brady is broken and the only entity in the criminal justice system
that has not supported major reform is the prosecution. Open file
discovery and other reforms provide viable options for ensuring that
favorable information is disclosed to the defense as mandated by Brady.
Trial judges do not need to wait for these external reform measures.
Trial judges currently have the power and resources to regulate and
reform the Brady disclosure duty. The duel approach of strict pretrial
regulation and the use of appropriate sanctions for Brady misconduct is
an effective formula for preventing Brady violations.
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